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What causes regions of the Russian Federation to opt for conflict with the central authority? Why do some 
regions legitimate their conflict with Moscow in overtly ethnic tones, while others do not? In attempting to answer 
these questions, this research responds to the need for a reconfigured understanding offederalism and ethnicity in 
modern society; more specifically, it answers several lingering questions from previous investigations of primordial 
and rational choice theories. 
This research concludes that the likelihood offuture conflict with Moscow can, in fact, be broken down 
~ystematically and predicted. In support of its arguments, the study (1) suggests a two-pronged method of regional 
analysis that captures primordial and rational explanations of center/periphery conflict, (2) demonstrates the 
accuracy ofa model that simulates this analysis on the macro-level, and (3) tests the suggested theory on the micro­
level through an in-depth study ofthe critical case of Tatarstan. In the end, this investigation finds that the regions 
of Russia's ethnic federation will pursue their set preference for autonomy whenever certain variables-- ethnic 
or otherwis~lower the risks associated with center/periphery conflict. 
.AGuide to Tables and Figures. 
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At first glance, recent history seems to support the claim that ethnicity still defines Russian 
politics. Wars are still fought over culture and alliances are seemingly made along ethnic lines, and so it 
seems logical to ascribe center/periphery conflicts to the natural, inexorable expression of identities. 
Therefore, many scholars have emphasized ethnicity's role in Russian federal relations by asserting that 
the trend towards conflict is based in ancient Russian identities. This study contends that such 
explanations are insufficient when taken alone. Still, it cannot be denied that ethnicity and identity 
continue to matter in modem Russia-- the question is: why and under what conditions does ethnicity 
matter? Why do regional leaders play the "ethnic card" in relations with Moscow? 
A BriefEthnic History ofthe Russian State 
For over a millennium, Russian rulers promoted the political strength of the state over ethnic 
concerns. In doing so, they created a state that differs sharply from most other of the West. Modem states 
most often organized around a specific ethnic identity; Russia, in contrast, gathered hundreds of different 
ethnic groups under a single authority. In order to complete this task, the Russian government repeatedly 
adjusted its policy towards minority ethnicities. Leaders occasionally redefined and manipulated the 
concept of ethnicity in order to meet the goals of the state. The long-term effects of these actions 
continue to be felt. 
For the majority of the second millennium, Russia existed as an imperial state. Its borders 
expanded and contracted quite frequently; it was constantly overtaking and abandoning regional ethnic 
groups. In order to preserve this ever-changing body, identity was defined as a function of the state rather 
than of regional culture. Ethnic groups residing within the borders of imperial Russia were asked - or, 
more often, forced- to assume a common language and religion as: 
the state created a territorial empire spanning a huge landmass and populated by a diverse array of 
European and Asian peoples, who differed profoundly among themselves in religion, way of life, 
and relationship to Russian authority (Remington). 
In this complicated situation, the suppression of ethnicity existed alongside the manipulation of identity. 
Ethnic groups were asked to identify themselves as citizens of the Russian Empire and nothing more. 
In 1917, the Russian Revolution and the advent of Soviet rule led to a sea change in relations 
between ethnic groups and the state. Whereas imperial govemments had promoted a purely Russian 
identity over all others, the Soviet Empire was prevented from doing so, due to the simple fact that it was 
comprised of multiple national republics. Therefore, the Soviet government chose to actively employ its 
ethnic diversity as a tool for controlling its citizenry. During the 20th century, entire communities were 
invented for political purposes, cultural groups were granted superficial autonomy, and ethnicities were 
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erased from the record books. This effect is most clearly crystallized in the experiences of the 21 ethnic 
republics, as is demonstrated in Figure I.I. In the most tragic cases, attempts were made to exterminate 
entire populations, as with the Ukrainians during the Holodomor. 1 The Soviet period thereby inflamed 
and confused ethnic identity, causing inhabitants of the Russian state to view central authority as an 
outside force, to which they were always beholden but frequently disloyal. 
As the Russian Communist state collapsed at the end of the 20th century, ethnic identity once 
again emerged as an urgent issue. For most ethnic groups, the past millennium had been an elongated 
cultural trial. The process of constant ethnic manipulation had created an environment in which self­
identity was confusing at best and dangerous at worst. Post-Soviet leaders addressed this landscape by 
designing a federal state2 consisting of 88 units, each belonging to one of several categories of autonomy 
and composition (see Table I.I). Of the total 88 federal units, 31 exist as ethnic regions with a specific 
titular nationality. 
Russian Federalism can be confusing to those who wish to engage in business and political 
relationships: one cannot merely consider a commitment to Russia but to Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Komi or 
Chechnya as well. The region of Kalmykia provides an example. Since its first national elections in 1993, 
the region has been under the rule of President Kirsan Iiyumzhinov. Mr. Iiyumzhinov has compiled a list 
of actions that range from the irresponsible to the bizarre: he has abolished the parliament, altered the 
constitution, threatened to tum the region into an independent tax haven, and single-handedly orchestrated 
the construction of Chess City (a 50-million dollar recreation complex on the outskirts of the capital city). 
President Iiyumzhinov's behavior, coupled with Moscow's inability and apparent unwillingness to 
interfere with his actions, clearly demonstrate that the quality of leadership varies dramatically across the 
regional patchwork. 
A second and more pressing concern is the humanitarian cost that regional conflict may extol. 
Statistics regarding the conflict in Chechnya alone are staggering: 500,000 civilian refugees, symptoms of 
physical or emotional distress among 86% of the population, 25,000 troop deaths, and perhaps 250,000 
total casualties. Sadly, modem Russia plays witness to similar violent conflicts with unacceptable 
frequency- massacres at a school in Beslen and an opera house in Moscow are perfect examples. Often, 
Russia manages these situations without international scrutiny. By understanding the sources of federal 
conflict- and the role of ethnicity in such conflicts-- it may be possible to prevent the worst excesses of 
regional conflict. 
I A deliberate, Soviet-created famine that nearly wiped out the USSR's Ukrainian population in 1932 and 1933. 
1 A map of the m<XIern Russian Federation is presented in Appendix A. 
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Cate~ories of Federal Units 
(from most to least autotlomolls) 
Type Ethnically 
Based? Number 
Republic Yes 21 
Oblast No 48 
Krai No 7 
Autonomous Oblast Yes 1 
Autonomous Okrug Yes 9 
Federal City No 2 
Table 1.1 
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Primordialism versus Rational Choice 
Researchers and pundits often argue that ethnic conflicts stem primarily from endemic qualities 
held by distinct cultural groups. Lists of the relevant dimensions of ethnicity typically include salient 
cultural aspects such as appearance, religion, language, custom, and history.3 Primordial theory relies 
on the notion that these cultural identifiers determine the nature of the relationship between actors. 
Primordialists assume a level of permanance when referring to ethnicity; they often assert that, 
"congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on... have ineffable, and at times overpowering, 
coerciveness in and of themselves [Emphasis added]" (Geertz, 42) and that ethnic identity will inevitably 
influence government and politics. Such an influence will occur when an ethnic group recognizes or 
believes that it is somehow different than the dominant national ethnicity and seeks to manage the effects 
of its "otherness". 
In keeping with this theory, primordialists have argued that Russia's status as a multiethnic, multi­
national state continues to determine its political momentum in the most basic of ways (Bahry 2005; 
Coakley 1992; Drobezheva 2005; Ellingsen 2000; Gibson 2001; Hale 2004; and Hughes 2002). 
Primordial scholars point to the collapse of the multi-ethnic Soviet Union, noting that ethnic groups 
began to identify themselves publicly during the perestroika period and that "'repressed' nationalisms 
inevitably reemerged the moment that Gorbachav removed the coercive controls formerly 
imposed" (Hanson 4). Researchers have asked whether the Russian Federation might face similar 
centripetal tendencies. In their view, ethnicity is fundamental to human social identity and essentially 
trumps other sources of identity in political mobilization and organization. Scholars of the primordial 
school discount the importance of factors, such as economic development and natural resources, when 
considering regional conflict; rather, they posit that Russia's federal system, because it is organized 
around ethnicity, is vulnerable to fragmentation and devolution along ethnic lines. The highly diverse 
statuses of the 21 ethnic groups to whom a republic has been granted is demonstrated in Figure 1.2. In other 
words, it may not be sufficient to offer ethnic regions a modicum of sovereignty. They will always seek 
to maximize their own autonomy at the expense of rational authority. 
3 "Primordial Ties", Geertz. 
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Some scholars, however, point out that ethnic nationalism does not always lead to conflict and 
indeed regions (as actors) will enter into conflict with the center only when the rewards of such an 
endeavor outweigh the costs. All parties are assumed to approach the table in an attempt to benefit and 
that, furthermore, they do so only after having completed an analysis of their own position. Such an 
analysis will, presumably, lead to their acceptance of a rational strategy in terms of costs and benefits. 
Hence, a theory of rationality, here, has two meanings: 
First, it means consistency of choice: If I prefer A over Band B over C, then I must prefer A over 
C. The second meaning is identical with self-interest. Action is rational if it is aimed at realizing 
self-interest. If costs of an action outweigh benefits, self-interest will not be served; hence a cost­
benefit calculus accompanies analysis based on self-interest [Emphasis added]. (Varshney 86-87) 
Witnesses to political bargaining can therefore expect to observe behavior patterns that "conjoin means 
[mobilizable resources] to ends [preferences] most efficiently from the standpoint of the actor." 4 We may 
assume that, ceteris paribus, regional actors see greater autonomy from central administration as being in 
their self-interest. Rogowski first discussed the implications of this dynamic in his seminal work in the 
area of nationalism and rational choice theory. 5 He and others have asserted that regions always prefer 
greater control over their own regional resources and decisions. 
Rationalists also assume that the analysis performed by regions involves a review of their 
resource endowments (economic and political capital). Useful endowments includes such measures as 
international economic influence, natural resource potential and geographic importance. The large 
difference in the economic activity of Russia's ethnically-based republics is demonstrated in Figure 1.J. In 
cases in which this capital is present, leaders will likely realize that their economic power allows them to 
realistically challenge central authority. Such regions will decide that they have enough bargaining chips 
to win a given argument; therefore, they will act confidently and aggressively towards the center. Past 
research has already shown that this system of preference pursuit based on costs and benefits is explicitly 
evident in nationalist and ethnic behavior (Rogowski 1985; Bates 1974). 
4 Rogowski 30.
 
5 See ""Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support", 1974.
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Rational Choice Theories 6
 
6 This investigation originally appeared in an earlier paper ("Ancient Bonds, Contemporary Powers"; Strand, 2006). 
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The Study of Ethnic Federalism and the Russian State. Previous scholarship regarding ethnic 
federations can be divided into two subtly different areas of emphasis. The first vein includes those 
studies that primarily address minorities (Saideman 1997; Wright, Jr. 1991; Brancati 2006; Hale, 2004). 
The second includes research that is more focused on federations (Coakley 1992; Ellingsen 2000). Both 
of these schools rely heavily on the groundbreaking research of William Riker? and have built upon both 
his and other studies in order to analyze the complex relationship between governance and ethnicity. 
A large number of area studies have been conducted regarding Russia and its behavior as an 
ethnic federation. Russia's unique post-Communist situation has offered scholars a chance to analyze the 
behavior of ethnic groups, both in the current Federation (Bahry et al. 2005; Zassorin 2000) and in 
conjunction with its Soviet history (Hanson 1998; Tishkov 1999). These studies have confirmed the more 
general conclusions of ethnic research by showing that ethnicity still matters in modem Russia. 
The emergence of the Russian Federation has also provided scholars with an opportunity to 
observe and critique the way in which a developing federal state matures and behaves (Gibson 2001; Herd 
1999; Lynn et al. 1997). Specifically, many studies have analyzed the negotiation of Russia's unique 
regional constitutions (Filippov et al. 1998; Stoner-Weiss 1999; Chebankova 2005). Researchers have 
also documented national development in order to compare the nature of Russia's federation with that of 
its communist predecessor (Alexseev 2001; Drobizheva 2005; Hale 2000). Lastly, there exists a group of 
scholars who have chosen to focus their research squarely on Russian regions. Their studies assess the 
region's role and behavior as part of the larger federal unit (Treisman 1997; Dowley 1998; Bahry 2005). 
This collection of research clearly demonstrates that federal regions are independent actors for whom 
unique economic and political situations lead to diverse actions. 
Researchers have therefore established a number of clear notions regarding the Russian 
Federation. The following conclusions can be seen as the first four pieces of the puzzle that was 
confronted: 
1. Cultural identity still matters in modem Russia. 
2. Ethno-federalism often breeds ethnic conflict. 
3. Modem economic and political factors vary among Russia's federal units. 
4. Two theories attempt to explain to federal conflict: primordialism and rational choice theory. 
The fourth and final conclusion was most pertinent to the research. Indeed, it was by testing 
these two schools against one another that the study hoped to establish a more reliable method of 
analyzing center/periphery conflict in modem Russia. 
7 Federalism' Origin Operation Significance, 1964. 
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Testing Conflict among Russian Regions: Methods & Models 
Selecting the Most Appropriate Cases. The first issue confronted was case selection. The study 
recognized that, in order to accurately test the hypotheses, cases had to be (1) autonomous, (2) ethnically 
based, and (3) similar and numerous enough to ensure reliable results. Unfortunately, the Russian 
Federation is composed of 88 highly diverse subjects; therefore, it was logistically impossible to collect 
the necessary data for all cases. It was also apparent that many of the federal member states do not 
possess the resources or even the authority required to behave aggressively towards the center. Therefore, 
the study selected the 21 autonomous republics of the Russian Federation as its case set.8 These 21 cases 
boasted a high level of autonomy, an ethnic basis, and the amount of available data necessary to conduct 
the intended research. In addition, the study gained the increased reliability that stems from investigating 
an entire universe of cases (all 21 autonomous regions). 
The Research Design Model. Operationalization of the suggested concepts required extensive 
intuitive reasoning. In order to accurately capture the complexity of the referenced ideas, indices were 
constructed as a proxy for each of the main independent variables (primordialism and rational choice 
theory) and the dependent variable (regional aggression). The research model presented in Figure 1.4 was 
utilized in order to test the main hypothesis, which was that rational choice theory will be more strongly 
associated with regional aggression than will primordialism and will, therefore, more accurately predict 
regional stability. 
The Testing Schedule. The study's use of a tiered measurement system-one that utilized both 
individual indicators and additive indices- allowed for a sequence of increasingly precise tests. First, in 
the Pre-test Phase, the study constructed an accurate measure of the dependent variable. Phase One 
included a preliminary analysis of the six individual indicators. Lastly, in Phase Two, the study used the 
results of the preliminary investigations to construct its main indices and test the main hypothesis. 
Therefore, the schedule of tests was: 
Pre-test Phase 
1.0perationalization and Measurement of the Dependent Variable 
Phase One 
2. Bivariate Analysis of the Individual Indicators 
3. Eta9 (r]) Analysis of the Individual Indicators
 
Phase Two
 
4. Construction of the Main Indices 
5. Bivariate Analysis of the Indices 
6. Linear Regression Analysis of the Indices 
8 A full list of the cases can be found in Appendix B.
 
9 Eta is a test of association commonly used when the dependent variable is interval in nature and the independent variable is
 
categorical. 1]2 can be used as a proxy for r2.
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Pre- Test Phase: Measming Aggressive Behavior 
The operationalization and measurement of aggression posed two puzzles. The first was, of 
course, which indicators would provide an accurate measure of regional aggression; for instance, the 
study had to ensure that it was measuring aggressive behavior towards the center and not from it. The 
second puzzle was how best to choose variables so that all forms of aggression were accurately accounted 
for. 
The study confronted the first puzzle by reviewing past research that utilized federal and regional 
aggression as a variable. A review of the existing literature suggested five reliable means of 
operationalization: 
Tjmjng of region's declaration of sovereignty (SOVER) 10. This indicator measured the political 
aggression shown by the region during the transitory phase of the development of the Russian state, and used 
rankings created by Triesman ". 
Index of Constitutjonal Aggression (CONSn This indicator represented a measure of the amount 
of aggression encapsulated in the bilateral constitution negotiated by the region and the federal authority. It 
was constructed through a content analysis, which included a review of a study that was completed by 
Stoner-Weiss in 1999. 
Instances of protest War and Rebelljon (WAR) This value was utilized to take account of any 
instances of actual physical violence that occurred in the regions and used data collected by the Minorities At 
Risk project since 1991. 
Aggression in Elite Actiyity (ELITE) In order to measure the level of aggression shown by regional 
elites towards Moscow, the study relied upon the extensive content analysis completed by Dowley*, who 
then translated her findings into the scale that was directly borrowed. 
Instances of Assertjon of Legal and Resource Rights (LEG ASNI}?ES ASN) Again using data 
collected by Daniel Triesman for his 1997 study, a dummy variable was created for each type of assertion, 
with a score of 0 denoting no assertion and 1 indicating at least one instance of assertion. 
A second puzzle that required close attention was how the research could best measure each of the 
preceding indicators in appropriate proportion. For example, when considering a region's overall 
aggressive activity, an instance of armed aggression towards federal authority clearly had to carry greater 
weight than an assertion of resource rights. The study therefore utilized an index that included each 
indicator along with an assigned weight, which was represented as a cofactor. The Aggregate Center/ 
Periphery Aggression Index 11 (ACPAI), whose scores are depicted in Figure 1.5, is 
(5*WAR) + (4*ELITE) + (3*CONST) + (3*SOVER) + (l*LEG.ASN) + (l*RES.ASN). 
10 Explanations of this and all other data manipulations can be found in Appendix C. 
• For specific figures and scales, see Appendix D.
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Phase One: Assessing the Indi,~dual Hypotheses and Indicators 
Qperationalizin~ the Primordial School. The study derived the following set of auxiliary 
hypotheses from primordial theory: 
HJ.l = Titular nationalities that have been historically autonomous will show more aggression
 
in regional relations with the center.
 
HI.2 = Those titular nationalities that do not share the Russian Orthodox religion will be more
 
likely to show aggression in center-periphery relations.
 
HJ.3 = Those titular nationalities that reside in a region in which they constitute a majority will
 
show more aggression in relations with the center.
 
Each of these hypotheses captured an essential aspect of the theory that was outlined in previous 
primordial literature. The first hypothesis assessed a key aspect of the historical experience of each 
ethnicity; the second took account of ethnic religion (which, it was believed, corresponds closely with 
other cultural identifiers); and the third measured each ethnicity's demographic status in their region and, 
thereby, the potentialirnpact oftheir activity as an ethnic group. 
Indicators that corresponded with each primordial hypothesis were then identified. The choice of 
such a system required that each indicator move in the same direction; that is, a higher score had to 
indicate a higher degree of primordial differentiation from the center. It is also worth noting that 
primordial theory, due to its strictly ethnic nature, could not be accurately tested through an assessment of 
the actual regions. Therefore, the study's 'primordial' variables indirectly measured the Russian regions 
by measuring each region's titular nationality. The following indicators were selected for their intuitive 
connection to the hypotheses and their frequent inclusion in the literature: 
MajQrity or MinQrity Status (MIN MA,D This indicator was a dummy variable that denQtes whether 
or not the titular nationality for which the region was created exists as a regiQnal majQrity Qr a minority. 
Those ethnicities with majQrity status received a score of 0 and those with minority status received a score of 
1. This classification was based upQn data collected frQm the Statesman's YearboQk. 
ReligiQus Status (REL). Data was cQlIected regarding the faith to which each regiQn's titular 
nationality generally ascribes. This infQrmation was fQund using the Minorities at Risk data set and was 
given as a dummy variable, with 0 signifYing adherence tQ the Russian OrthQdox faith and a SCQre of 1 
denQting ascriptiQn tQ any Qther religion. 
HistQrjcal AutQnQmy (A Un. In order to gauge the historical perspective of each titular nationality, 
each region was assigned a dummy variable that signified its historical status as an autonomous state. 
Research was performed on each regiQn's titular natiQnality and, subsequently, each region was assigned a 
score of either 0 Qr 1, with I signifYing that an ethnicity enjoyed autonomy within an independent state at any 
point in history. 
- IS­
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Measuring Rational Choice Theory. The auxiliary hypotheses that this study derived from 
rational choice theory were: 
H1.1 = Regions with central capitals that have a larger population and a more urbanized society
 
will be more aggressive in center-periphery relations.
 
H1.1 = Regions that contain oil production or transport facilities will be more aggressive in
 
center-periphery relations.
 
H1.3 = Regions whose economies are more engaged as foreign and domestic traders will show
 
more aggression in their relations with central authority.
 
Each of these statements corresponded with an essential component of regional resource 
endowments. The first measured the development of each region, by the assumption that large urban 
centers suggest internal growth; the second hypothesis took account of oil production and transportation, 
which plays a critical role in the larger Russian economy; and the third assessed each region's status in the 
domestic and international economy. The following indicators were utilized to measure the suggested 
concepts: 
Population of the Re~ionaJ Capital (CAPPO?). As a measure of the region's urbanization and 
development, the population of each capital city was found. These figures were then used to construct a 5­
point scale, with higher values representing a larger size. 
Economic Interaction (ECON INn. In order to assess each region as an economic actor, data 
provided by the Bank of Russia was utilized. This study gathered the figures for each region in four 
categories: A) federal rubles borrowed by private enterprises. B) federal rubles borrowed by public 
enterprises, C) total foreign sales per month and D) total foreign purchases per month. 
Oil Resources (alL). Information regarding the location of key oil production sites and various oil 
transportation structures was collected from the Environmental Information Agency. Regions were then 
assigned a score of 0 if no oil production or transportation takes place within the region, I if the region is 
home to some form of oil transportation structure, and 2 if the region contains oil production sites. 
Tests of the Six Indicators. The first procedure, a test of bivariate correlation, measured 
association between the dependent variable and each of the six individual indicators. The results, which 
can be found in Table 1.2, were most useful when grouped according to the theory from which they were 
derived. This division into primordial and rational choice indictors later allowed for the construction of 
the main indices. 
When considering the primordial variables, it was clear that the most strongly correlated indicator 
was an ethnic group's majority or minority status. Indeed, none of the other primordial variables showed 
a significant correlation with regional aggression. Therefore, the possession of a non-majority language 
or religion did not appear to have a significant influence on the amount of aggression with which a region 
behaves. In sum, the strongest primordial determinant of regional aggression was whether or not the 
titular nationality resides in a region in which its members constitute a majority. 
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Bivariate Correlations 
Primordial Indicators Pearson's R Significance 
Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic 
Minority or Majority .469* .016 
Titular Nationality's Sharing of the 
Russian Orthodox Faith 
.289 .102 
Historical Autonomous Status .334 .069 
Rational Choice Indicators 
Population of Capital City .470* .016 
Presence of Oil or Oil Pipeline .319 .080 
Economic Interaction .454* .019 
*- Significance at the .05 level. 
-
-
Table 1.2 
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The results of bivariate tests involving the rational choice indicators offered further opportunities 
for analysis. It was clear, though not surprising, that regional aggression was most strongly correlated 
with economic interaction and the volume of the capital population. Since these indicators take direct 
account of a region's economic development, the findings agreed with the main hypothesis. It is equally 
noteworthy, however, that there appeared to be a surprisingly weak relationship between regional 
aggression and involvement in the oil industry. 
The study next conducted an auxiliary test of the indicators using an eta measurement. In the 
research, the eta tests were performed in order to simply reinforce the results of the bivariate analysis. All 
eta values mirrored the fmdings of the primary tests; thus, the scores appeared to increase the validity of 
previous results. 12 
Analysis of Phase One. It should first be noted that all relationships moved in the directions 
predicted by the hypotheses, and that three of the six hypotheses received significant support from the 
results (see Table 1.3). 
Second, majority status appeared to be the only primordial variable that correlated with regional 
aggression at a significant level. This is interesting in that majority status was also the primordial 
indicator that most readily fit with the arguments presented by rational choice theory. Indeed, the study 
argued only that majority or minority status does not independently lead to conflict; it remains quite 
possible that population demographics exert a strong influence and make the mobilization of ethnicity a 
more realistic option by reducing the costs and increasing the benefits of conflict. 
Third, the weak correlation shown between oil production and regional aggression required 
attention. This finding posed a dilemma for those who would argue that oil is a frequent cause of conflict 
between the center and periphery. Of course, the results could have been due to the fact that the 
possession of oil leads to interference from central authority (to which regions are unable to respond). It 
had to be remembered that the study only measures regional aggression towards the center; therefore, it 
could not account for such conflict even if it did exist. Whether or not this was the case, it was worth 
noting that regions that were active in the production and transport of oil were no more likely to act 
aggressively towards central authority than those that were not. 
12 Results of the eta test can be found in Appendix E. 
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Summary ofAuxiliary Hypotheses 
Hn Indicator Correct Significant?* Direction? 
Hi.} Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic Minority or Majority Yes Yes 
Primordial Hu Titular Nationality's Sharing of the Russian Orthodox Yes NoIndicators Faith 
H1.3 Historical Autonomous Status Yes No 
Hv Population of Capital City Yes Yes 
Rational 
Choice H2.2 Presence of Oil or Oil Pipeline Yes No 
Indicators 
H2.3 Economic Interaction Yes Yes 
*- At the .05 level. 
-
-
-
-
-­
Table 1.3 
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Phase Two: Testing the Rival Schools 
Constructing the Indices. The Aggregate Primordial Indicator Index 13 (APII) was constructed in 
accordance with the following two lessons, taken from the preliminary tests: (1) status as an ethnic 
minority or majority appeared to be the most influential and, therefore, the most important of the three 
indicators and (2) while both religion and historical autonomy had weak correlations with aggression, 
religion's correspondence with other cultural identifiers (language, culture, custom) required that it be 
more heavily considered. When scaled in accordance with these lessons and combined into a single index, 
the measures accurately portrayed the identity of each titular nationality. The APII was represented as 
(6 *REL) + (6 *MIN.MAJ) + (3 *AUT) 
The Aggregate Rational Choice Indicator Index 14 (ARCII) was constructed based upon the 
following observations: (1) oil did not have a very strong influence on the rational behavior of each 
region and (2) both the population of the capital city and the level of economic interaction had significant 
and strong correlation with regional aggression. In order to account for the apparent variance in influence 
among these indicators, the study chose to structure the ARCII in the following manner: 
(3 *CAP.POP) + (3 *ECONINT) + (OIL) 
Testing the Indices. The initial test of the indices utilized simple bivariate correlation (see Table 
I.4). The results showed that both of the indices possessed a significantly strong level of association with 
the dependent variable. Moreover, the findings supported the research's main hypothesis: when 
operationalized, rational behavior theory is more strongly associated with regional aggression than is 
primordial theory, though by a relatively small margin. 
The study next conducted a more rigorous, head-to-head test of the indices using the linear 
regression method. This procedure allowed for a comparison of each index's influence when controlling 
for its counter-argument; therefore, if consistent with the results of previous tests, these findings would 
greatly increase this study's confidence in its fmdings. The results of the OLS test are presented in Table 
I.5· 
An initial consideration is that a single model that includes both independent variables accounted 
for roughly half of the variance in the dependent variable (R2= .503); this association was also highly 
significant (nearly at the .001 level). These fmdings supported the assumption that primordial and 
rational behavior indicators each playa large role in determining regional aggression. 
13 The APIl shows a mean of 7.429, a standard deviation of 5.8187, and a Cronbach's alpha of .580. 
14 The ARCH possesses a mean of 18.167, a standard deviation of7.1438, and a Cronbach's alpha of .652 
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Bivariate Correlations 
lndices Pearsons R Sig. 
Rational Choice Indicator Index .524** .004 
Primordial Indicator Index .486* .016 
*- Significance at the .05 level. 
**. Significance at the .001 level 
.­
·0 
Table I.4. 
Linear Regression Model 
Summary 
R .709 
R Square .503 
Significance .002 
Linear Regression Results 
Beta Weights Sig. 
Rational Choice Indicator Index .517** .006 
Primordial Indicator Index .478** .010 
**. Significance at the .001 level 
-.~ 
-
Table 1.5 
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The most valuable results of any linear regression test are the beta weights. Through these 
values, the OLS procedure allowed for a direct comparison of each index's effect when controlling for its 
rival theory; therefore, the results were critical to the study. One of the strengths of beta weights as a tool 
of measurement is that these values do not require much analysis; quite simply, the Rational Choice Index 
showed a larger beta weight than the Primordial Index. However, the difference between the two indices' 
influences was decidedly non-conclusive. Therefore, these values demonstrated that while rational 
choice theory is more strongly correlated with aggressive behavior, primordialism S basic arguments 
regarding ethnicity s continuing relevance cannot be discounted. In addition, these results were 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable and, therefore, allowed for a high level of confidence. 
Conclusions of the Research. The investigation's main hypothesis was most succinctly and 
directly verified through a linear regression analysis, which clearly showed that the Aggregate Rational 
Choice Indicator Index did indeed have a stronger correlation with the Center/Periphery Aggression 
Index. Two useful conclusions can be made based upon the findings. The first conclusion is that in order 
to accurately predict regional stability in the Russian Federation, actors should assess the given region's 
"bargaining chips". The second and more generalizable conclusion is that cultural differences are not the 
strongest determinants of conflict in Russian center/periphery relations. In other words, the study disputed 
Geertz's assertion that ethnic characteristics "have ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in 
and of themselves" when considering federal relations in modern Russia (42). 
The research achieved its goal of showing that regional conflict in the Russian Federation is most 
strongly governed by the rules of bargaining theory--however, its results are not overwhelming and its 
conclusions suggest several new questions. Critically, the study found that roughly 50% ofthe variance in 
the observed regional behavior remained unaccounted for; moreover, while the argument for strictly 
primordial dynamics was indeed weakened, the results suggested that the influence ofethnicity cannot be 
ignored. 
These considerations demonstrate a remaining puzzle regarding the behavior of ethnic regions in 
the context of rational choice theory. The negation of ethnicity as the cause of conflict per se necessitates 
that cultural identity be somehow synthesized with the new model- clearly, to discount the continuing 
influence of ethnic principals in Russian politics would be folly. While the research was able to conceive 
of a model for regional rational behavior, one of its most critical mechanisms (which is explicitly 
recognized in Figure 1.6) remains undefined. Therefore, an intriguing series of questions remains: when 
does ethnic mobilization become a part of a regional strategy for obtaining greater autonomy? How does 
ethnicity become a "bargaining chip"? Why is conflict vis-a-vis Moscow an option for some regions and 
not for others? 
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By disputing primordialism and a model of federal relations that emphasizes pure ethnicity, 
previous research has taken the first steps in creating a more useful model of center/periphery relations in 
modem Russia. Still, researchers must face the puzzle of why some regions legitimate their rational 
claims in explicitly primordial terms while others do not. A bit of deductive reasoning leads to the 
conclusion that a synthesis of primordialism and rational choice theory offers a very promising 
opportunity to solve this puzzle. A previous study 15 took the first step in explaining the link between 
primordialism and rational choice theory by hypothesizing that "[ethnic] stratification has no direct effect 
on an ethnic group's propensity to engage in collective action, but that its influence is mediated by the 
establishment of ethnic organizations or quasi-groups" (431). According to this hypothesis, it is probable 
that primordial variables, when mobilized as "bargaining chips", have a significant influence on regional 
behavior. Hechter sums up the potential of such a synthesis by stating that it "offers the prospect of 
arriving at predictive statements, rather than at the post hoc descriptions [of ethnic behavior] for which 
sociologists have had to settle too frequently in the past" (91). 
Which Aspects of Ethnicity Make Conflict Likely? Research must first identify those ethnic 
qualities that increase the likelihood for conflict in center/periphery relations. In order to do so, this study 
performed a review of the relevant literature (Makarychev 2000; Duchacek 1988; Giuliano 2000; Hale 
2000; Beissinger 2002; Cruz 2000; Wendt 1999). It then developed the following list of the 
characteristics that lend themselves to ethnically aggressive behavior center/periphery relations. Based 
upon the tenets of rationalist theory, it follows that these regional characteristics- which will be referred 
to as "cultural equipment" 16 - will become part of a strategy of overtly ethnic rhetoric in center/ 
periphery conflict. Cultural equipment can be disaggregated into at least five characteristics, the presence 
of which will help determine whether ethnic regions mobilize along ethnic lines: 
1. A history ofethnic independence. 
Previous research and analysis suggests that ethnic groups for whom independence was once a 
reality are far more likely to act engage in conflict with central authority (Wendt 1999; Cruz 2000; Hale 
2000). This is not to say that these regions will explicitly attempt to regain their former independence; 
rather, they will be more likely to assert themselves in any number of ways. This factor implies that 
ethnic and regional history continues to impact contemporary identity in a very real way 17; indeed, 
"whether in war or peace, a collectivity expresses and defends its identity by declaring, 'We are as we are 
15 "A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action''', Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum.
 
16 This term is taken from Beissinger, 2002.
 
17 It should be noted, however, that this study is considering factual history as distinctly different than myth; indeed, the invention
 
of an ethnic saga will have a wholly different impact than history as it truly occurred (see characteristic #4).
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because the world has made us this way'''.18 A history of autonomy allows regional leaders to cite their 
past as both a source of ethnic unity and a precedent for future independence. 
2. An ethnic majority in the region. 
Initially, the connection between a larger ethnic population and rational behavior may seem 
obvious; it could be considered a truism that a larger ethnic group will be more likely to act with 
confidence. This study argues, however, that not only will larger ethnic groups act confidently- they will 
also be more likely to explicitly assert their rights as a region. Linear regressions performed by 
Beissinger (2002) statistically support this fact; indeed, Beissinger finds that population size is the most 
reliable predictor of separatist behavior. 
3. The support ojjoreign nations or organizations. 
It is widely agreed that the "globalized" society in which we now live has created a radically new 
international dynamic. Investigations of this modem political system have been extremely important, 
particularly for scholars concerned with the increasingly global impact of regional politics (Duchacek 
1988; Makarychev 2000). A compelling body of research suggests that actions taken by international 
organizations profoundly affect ethno-federal conflicts (and vice versa). Elazar crystalizes this new 
interaction by stating that 
at one time, the sharp separation of boundaries between foreign affairs as the responsibility of 
the domestic general government and domestic affairs as the primary responsibility of the 
constituent governments was a given in federal systems. This is no longer the case. (xx) 
It stands to reason that the support of actors who lie outside of a given region's federal system will 
increase that region's propensity for ethnically based conflict with the center. This support could come 
from any number of sources: foreign governments, religious organizations, international organizations, 
and even terrorist groups; in the same way, support may come in several different forms, including 
money, rhetoric, and military supplies. In short, there is significant evidence to suggest that international 
support for an ethnic territory's autonomy increases the likelihood that the given region will assert its will 
in ethnic terms. 
4. Regional control over a "myth ojpeoplehood". 
This research has consistently referred to the plasticity and malleability of ethnicity. This fourth 
component of regional identity directly addresses that fact. In the politics of ethno-federal conflict, 
historical traditions are an enigma; more specifically, ethnic history is both fluid enough to be redefined 
by regional leaders and concrete enough to hold weight as a bargaining chip. Previous studies have 
thoroughly discussed this unique quality, most often in terms of individual preference and elite behavior 
18 Cruz. 
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(Gibson 1981; Giulano 2000; Hale 2000; Beissinger 2002). In arguing for the impact of cultural 
traditions on rational behavior, Wendt posits that "cultural phenomena are just as objective, just as 
constraining, just as real as power and interest. .. the point is that the real world consists of a lot more than 
material forces as such". The argument here is that if ethnic leaders are able to re-imagine, manipulate, or 
even invent a cultural history that somehow validates their engaging in center/periphery conflict, they are 
far more likely to bring their ethnicity to the bargaining table. 
5. Ethnic figureheads through which regional leaders can motivate the electorate. 
The availability of cultural symbols to motivate the electorate is closely related to the utilization 
of ethnic history (see #4, above). In both cases, regions that have a ready storehouse of cultural capital are 
better able to organize and mobilize claims for autonomy. This final component of cultural equipment, 
however, speaks more directly to the use of specific aspects of culture when attempting to take power 
from the center. Scholars have suggested that cultural aspects such as language, heraldry, geography, and 
even popular culture might be utilized in this way (Giulano 2000; Hale 2000; Cruz 2000; Gibson 1981). 
Based upon these studies, this research posits that the availability of salient cultural aspects will be 
correlated with conflict in center/periphery relations. Giuliano summarizes the argument by stating that 
symbolic issues are subject to the negotiation, manipulation, and coalition building of normal 
politics. The evidence presented here... recommends a reconceptualization of existing 
theories by focusing on the dynamic interaction between and among issues, voters, and 
politicians. (299, 313) 
By using the manifestations of culture as either a political motivator or a uniting symbol, regional leaders 
will utilize their ethnicity in conflicts with central authority. 
Re-irnagining Ethnic
 
Mobilization in the Russian Federation
 
It has been established that most regional behavior can be explained according to a given region's 
resource endowments. This first category of variables- referred to here as "resource endowment"- will 
always be mobilized as the basis of a region's attempt to gain autonomy. This research has identified a 
second category of variables19 that it has termed "cultural equipment". The primary components of each 
19 The analysis presented above is by no means an exhaustive list; indeed, this discussion includes only those ethnic 
characteristics that are strongly supported in previous research. Scholars have suggested a number of other possible correlates of 
ethnic rhetoric in regional aggression. For example, researchers have asserted the critical role played by non-related political 
events during system-wide periods of "thickened identity" that bring tides of ethnic conflict (Beissinger 1999). However, while 
these theories are both interesting and valid, this research has foregone including them for several reasons. First, these 
characteristics are only tangentially related to the actual identity of ethnic populations. Second, this study finds that these factors 
have yet to receive sufficiently conclusive support in research models. 
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group of variables are summarized in Table 1.6. Previous investigations have analyzed the mobilization of 
many of these variables; however, they have done so without grouping them into these two categories 
(Hale 2000; Beissinger 2002; Rabushka 1972). Rather, they have constructed various models to illustrate 
"the ways in which political entrepreneurs structure partisan debate and competition in order to achieve 
their goals". 20 This investigation is the first to conceptualize the dual mobilization of two groups of 
variables in center/periphery conflict. 
Preferences and the Dependent Variable. This study draws upon Rogowski's work in making two 
key assumptions: 1) that ethnically-based regions are best viewed as rational actors and 2) that a 
preference for increased autonomy is the most basic motivation for actors in center/periphery relations. 
As "power-maximizers", both the central authority and the peripheral regions always prefer to have 
complete authority and control. However, a basic tenet of federalist theory is that power is a limited 
resource which must be divided between actors and that it therefore must be taken from one actor in order 
to be granted to another. This reality, which is so fundamental to the theory of federal systems, is the 
main source of conflict in center/periphery relations. Conflict arises in federal relations when one of the 
actors attempts to gain a portion of the limited power. 
Remembering the two assumptions taken from Rogowski's research, logic allows us to conclude 
that in situations where either resource endowments or cultural equipment, or both, make the attempt to 
gain autonomy a rational strategy, it will be pursued. In essence, three rules form the underlying theory 
of this research's dependent variable: 1) conflict with the center (the only means of gaining autonomy) is 
always the hope of the power-maximizers, 2) regions, as rational actors, wait for the costs of such conflict 
to become sufficiently low before opting for it, and 3) these costs are lowered (and the probability of 
conflict is increased) through the availability of regional resources. The question is: in what situations 
does cultural equipment sufficiently lower the costs or raise the benefits of conflict with Moscow? 
Categorizing Regions. Identities. and Behaviors. Figure 1.7 provides a simple method by which to 
categorize the resource positions of Russian regions. Each region can be placed in one of the four 
quadrants according to its unique characteristics. Thus, each of the four quadrants corresponds to both a 
type of region and a pattern of behavior. 
20 "Distinctive Features of Politics in a Plural Society: A Paradigm", Rabushka and Shepsle. 
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Variables That Influence Center/Peripheo Conflict 
Cultural Equipment 
Characteristic Specific Connection (i.e., leads to conflict when...) 
Resource Endowments 
History Ethnic history sets a precedent for 
autonomy. 
Characteristic Specific Connection (i.e., leads to conflict when•..) 
Urban Urban society is correlated with 
Population Ethnic group makes up a majority of Population development of regional infrastructure. 
Size the regional population. 
Oil The petroleum industry depends upon 
Foreign International actors support assertive Production the region for stability. 
Interaction behavior by a region. 
Economic Trade provides protection against 
Control over 
'Myth' 
Regional leaders are able to 
manipulate and create eth.nic 
allegiance. 
Interaction 
Geographic 
economic sanctions. 
Regional location is of strategic 
Significance importance to the center. 
Cultural Regional leaders are able to connect 
Aspects cultural aspects to assertive arguments. 
~ 
--=-=­
Table 1.6 
A Model for Cateeorizine Russian Reeions 
Resource Endowments 
Low-Lm~¥--==========::;=========:::j.~Low-High 
I II 
III IV 
High-Low High-High 
FigureI.7 
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Placement along the X axis is decided after an assessment of the resources endowed to a given 
region. The Y axis measures the second category of characteristics identified by this study- those 
primordial and ethnic characteristics that will serve as cultural equipment. Thus, using these two 
measures as guides, any region can be easily placed within the four-cell table. As an example, after 
completing an assessment of these two categories for Region A, a point representing its resource position 
on the diagram can be accurately identified. After selecting this point and recognizing the quadrant in 
which it lies, Region A's potential conflict with central authority can be predicted. 
Predicted Patterns of Rational Behavior. This research predicts that regions in Quadrant I (Low­
Low), finding themselves with little or no economic might and an insufficient amount of ethnic potential, 
will not engage in center/periphery conflict. 
The behavior of regions in Quadrant II (High-Low) most precisely corresponds to that which 
has been discussed in previous research. These regions, possessing a sufficient amount of concrete 
resources, will behave according to the patterns suggested by basic rational choice theory; that is, they 
will assert themselves based upon the "classical" bargaining chips that they possess. These regions, 
however, will not legitimate their economic arguments in overtly ethnic terms, having recognized that 
they do not possess a sufficient amount of cultural equipment. 
Regions in Quadrant III (Low-High), who find themselves with a sufficient amount of cultural 
equipment but no economic or political clout, will attempt to wrest authority from the center using only 
their ethnic equipment. These regions may engage in center/periphery conflict even though they possess 
insufficient concrete resources. Their identity as an ethnic region is reason enough for them to assert 
themselves if they believe nationhood, their very survival as an ethnicity, is at risk. Famously, in this 
way, cases like Chechnya, Daghestan, Ingushetia, and North-Ossetia have pursued autonomy through 
ethno-federal relations even though they appear to have no "rational" reason to do so. The key argument 
here is that ethnic identity, once it reaches a certain degree of utility, becomes potent enough to supersede 
a deficit in concrete resources. In other words,jor regions that lie in Quadrant III, cultural equipment will 
be reason enough to engage in center/periphery conflict. 
Regions in Quadrant IV (High-High), possess both the cultural equipment and the resource 
endowments that ought to produce conflicts with the center over decision-making autonomy and resource 
control. 
Predicted Methods of Action. A second topic that this study will consider is the way in which 
these regional positions will be translated into action. Markusen (1987), suggests three categories of 
separatist strategy: policy shift claims, power shift claims, and separatist demands. Policy shift claims 
include those aggressive behaviors that do not at all contradict the established federal structure; actions in 
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this category include fiscal and monetary demands, requests for revenue sharing, and the enacting of 
tariffs or other trade barriers. These types of actions will most likely be taken by regions in Quadrant II 
(and, to a lesser degree, Quadrant IV). The second type of action, a power shift claim, is slightly more 
conflictual. While still abiding by the rules of the system in which they exist, regions will often demand 
greater autonomy or devolution in taking this type of action. These actions will be taken most often by 
the regions of Quadrant IV (and perhaps Quadrant II); these regions will have sufficient resources to 
demand more autonomy but will see no value in departing from the federal system. The third and final 
type of regional action is the most urgent and extreme- overtly separatist demands. Seeing no hope in 
the system that they currently inhabit, regions will look towards secession or other militant nationalist 
strategies. This type of action will only be observed in Quadrant III, where regional leaders are able to 
mobilize their populations on the basis of ethno-national claims but desperately lack resources to pass 
those claims through normal political channels. 
A Summary. According to the suggested system of categorization, which is summarized in Table 
I.7, (1) regions may still engage in center/periphery conflict for ethnic reasons, even in a system based 
upon rational preferences and (2) in some cases, regions engage in conflict with the center using solely 
their cultural characteristics. Neither of these two statements betrays any tenet of rational choice theory­
rather, they each strengthen the theory by allowing for the reintroduction of ethnicity into a purely rational 
system of modem ethno-federal conflict. 
Uniting Theory with Reality 
Placim: the Regions in the Four Cells. This research will test the proposed framework by first 
categorizing all of the federal regions. In order to approximate the resource endowments of all 88 
regions, this study will use the average monthly federal funds borrowed. This indicator measures 
economic activity, based upon the assumption that entities, both public and private, will need to borrow 
funds in order to grow. The values that it provides will show how much regions have tended to borrow; it 
is assumed that these values will be highly correlated with economic growth. Cultural equipment will 
measured in terms of the proportion of each region that claims to be ethnic Russian. The 
quantification of each region's Russian population (rather than of its ethnic minority) offers two attractive 
qualities: 1) it bypasses the problem of regional types (ethnically-based republic, region, autonomous 
region, etc.) by using the same measurement in all cases, regardless of nomenclature, and 2) it manages to 
approximate the potential for ethnic autonomy by way of pure numbers, and thereby avoids the troubles 
associated with quantifying hundreds of different 
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The Four Quadrants ,''.: 
Quadrant Regional Identity 
Predicted Behavior 
Pattern 
Predicted Method 
ofAction 
I Low A LowB 
Insufficient resources and, 
therefore, no conflict. None 
II High A LowB 
Conflict based upon purely 
contemporary principals. Policy Shift Claims 
III Low A HighB 
Conflict based upon purely 
ethnic principals. Separatist Demands 
IV HigbA High B 
Conflict based upon the 
ethnizalion of economic 
arguments. 
Power Shift Claims 
-,.. 
- ~ - - ~~ -
-'-. .,.." --­ -­
Table I.7 
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ethnic communities. 
While uni-dimensional measurements cannot fully gauge regional dynamics, this simple schema 
is sufficient to place the Russian regions in a way that strongly supports the plausibility of the framework. 
The results of the data analysis are presented in two forms below: graphically, as items on the four-celled 
diagram (Figure 1.8) and numerically, as a subdivided list of each region and its corresponding values 
(Table 1.8). Several observations are worth noting: 
1.	 The majority of cases lack both the cultural equipment and resource endowments to effectively 
challenge Moscow. This trend explains why most Russian regions (all of which remain "power­
maximizers") have not engaged in center/periphery conflict and why the Russian Federation does 
not face the same centripetal pressure as its predecessor. 
2.	 Very few regions are located in Quadrant IV, but all of these regions have demonstrated political 
aggression towards central authority and, consequently, have obtained extremely high levels of 
autonomy.21 This supports the assertion that very few will find the risks of conflict so minimal as 
to attempt to gain autonomy Moscow, but that the opportunity to do so will always be taken. 
3.	 A small number of aggressive (and highly autonomous) regions can be identified in Quadrant II. 
Most of their autonomy, however, has been gained through the relatively non-inflammatory 
method of policy shift claims. Few, if any, of these regions have entered into heated conflict with 
the center. This supports the hypothesis that regions without sufficient levels of cultural 
equipment will not mobilize ethnicity and so will not inspire the passionate and often extreme 
behavior that accompanies ethnically-based movements. 
4.	 There are a number of Russian regions whose violent conflict with the center has been so 
pronounced as to be widely covered by the international press (Daghestan, Ingushetia, and 
Chechnya, in particular). All of these so-called 'separatist' regions can be found in Quadrant III. 
This supports this research's claim that it is possible for regions to engage in center/periphery 
conflict (of a highly explosive nature) in the absence of resource endowments. 
When considered as a whole, the diagram therefore lends strong support to the suggestion that a rational 
pursuit of preferences can be observed in all cases. Only those regions who are either 1) at the highest 
extremes of one measure or 2) placed relatively highly on both scales, will act on their preferences and 
pursue autonomy through center/periphery conflict. What makes this statement possible, again, is the 
definition of rationality taken by this research- that rational behavior does not imply logical actions but, 
rather, a realistic analysis of the costs and benefits of an action. 
21 For infonnation regarding the center/periphery conflict in which these regions have engaged, see Alexseev 2001; Dowley 1998; 
Hale 2000; Stoner-Weiss 1999; Treisman 1997. 
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Region Russian Rubles Region Russian Rubles Population Borrowed Population Borrowed 
Quadrant IV Quadrant T, continued 
Republic of Sakha Yakutia 41.15% 1,607,158.00 R Nov gorod Region 93.92% 1I0,l7l.ooR 
Republic of Tatarstan 39.49% 7,068,851.00 R IvanovQ Region 93.69% 222,350.00 R 
Republic of Bashkortostan 36.32% 1.940.050.00 R Kaluga Region 93.47% 213,460.00 R 
Krasnador Territory' 3.68% 1.271,114.00 R Smolenski Region 93.38% 268,092.00 R 
Quadrant III Belgorod Region 92.88% 370,403.00 R 
Novosibirsk Region 93.01% 978,239.00 R Tver Region 92.49% 335,384.00 R 
Republic of Mari-EI 47.46% 79,888.00R AmurRegion 92.04% 182,471.00R 
Karachai- Cherkess Republic 33.65% 67,782.00 R Altai Territory 91.97% 392,882.00 R 
Republic of Kalmykia 3355% 316,545.00 R Kemerovo Region 91.92% 392,062.00 R 
Chuvash Republic 26.53% 133,232.00 R Kurgan Region 91.47% 97,228.00 R 
Kabardino-Balkar Republic 25.14% 137,992.00 R Tomsk Region 90.84% 43I,618.00R 
Republic of North-Osseria-Alania 23.19% 333,865.00 R Kirov Region 90.82% 160,487.00 R 
Republic of Tuva 20.11% 65,838.00 R Je.wish Autonomous Region 89.93% 33,237.00 R 
Republic of Daghestan 4.69% 832,869.00 R Primorski Territory 89.89% 1,182,587.00 R 
Republic of Chechnya 3.70% 717,184.00 R Irkutsk Region 89.88% 719,113.00 R 
Republic of Ingushetia 1.19% 22,257.00R Khabarovsk Territory 89.82% 1,246,145.00 R 
Quadrant n Chita Region 89.80% 192.676.00 R 
Nizhni Novogorod Region 94.%% 1,313,388.00 R Leningrad Region 89.58% 431,188.00 R 
Moscow Region 91.00% 3,302,775.00 R Volgograd Region 88.89% 297,564.00 R 
Ras(oy Region 89.35% 1,299.124.00 R Penza Region 86.35% 334,226.00 R 
Sverdlovsk Region 89.23% 2,372,924.00 R Saratov Region 85.94% 608,947.00 R 
Krasnoyarski Region 88.95% 1,473,692.00 R Murmansk Region 85.25% 374,138.00 R 
City of Moscow 84.83% 118,832,274.00 R Perm Region 85.18% 303.456.00 R 
St. Petersburg 84.73% 14,769,446.00 R Sakhalin Region 84.28% 478,517.00 R 
Samara Region 83.60% 1,618,801.00 R Omsk Region 83.47% 610,169.00 R 
Chelyabinsk Region 82.31% 1,952,680.00 R Kaliningrad Region 82.37% 513,627.00 R 
Tyumen Region 71.57% 8,310,007.00 R Stavropol Territory 81.60% 388,929.00 R 
Quadrant T Kamchatka Region 80.85% 316,495.00 R 
Vologda Region %.56% 270,372.00 R Republic of Khakassia 80.28% 64,607.00 R 
Tambov Region %.47% 110,668.00 R Magadan Region 80.18% 255,561.00 R 
Bryansk Region %.34% 122,292.00 R Republic of Karelia 76.64% 114,21 1.00 R 
Kursk Region 95.87% 270,264.00 R Orenburg Region 73.94% 225.679.00 R 
Lipetsk Region 95.83% 161,311.00 R Ulyanovsk Rgion 72.65% 201,081.00R 
Kostroma Region 95.58% 54,556.00R Astrakhan Region 69.69% 151.127.00 R 
Orel Region 95.32% 117,453.00 R Republic of Buryatia 67.82% 326,181.00R 
Tula Region 95.21% 405,671.00 R Adigei Republic 64.48% 55,838.00 R 
Yaroslavl Region 95.15% 311,095.00 R RepUblic of Mordovia 60.84% 528,166.00 R 
Vladimir Region 94.74% 144,666.00 R Udmurt Republic 60.12% 432,271.00 R 
Ryazan Region 9459% 261,348.00 R Komi Republic 5959% 303,764.00 R 
Pskov Region 94.25% 79,912.00 R Republic of Altai 57.41 % 19,377.00 R 
Arkhangelski Region 94.19% 273,564.00 R Chukot Autonomous Region 51.87% 175,941.00 R 
Voronezh Region 94.14% 484,566.00 R 
'­ .~ - .~ - -
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That this research has been able to logically categorize and arrange the Russian regions supports 
its claims. Moreover, the accuracy that the model possesses in predicting the actions taken by regions and 
levels of regional autonomy suggests that a highly rational system underlies even the most seemingly 
chaotic political situations. The logic of the system is made clear in Table 1.9 (which shows the way in 
which the proposed schema predicts reality) and Figure 1.9 (which portrays the distribution of the cases in 
the schema that this study has suggested). 
As a final test of the model, Tatarstan will be examined as a critical case. The region of Tatarstan 
sits squarely in the high-high category of the model, thanks to the strong ethnic heritage of the region's 
titular nationality and the thorough development of its economy. If center/periphery conflict is going to 
occur anywhere, it will occur in Tatarstan. Furthermore, by looking carefully at a single case, this study 
will be able to explore multiple dimensions of cultural equipment and resource endowment in a way that 
was impossible when examining the entire Federation. 
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Regions in The Four Quadrants 
Quadrant Regional 
Identity 
Predicted Behavior 
Pattern 
Predicted Method 
of Action 
Regions that Fall 
Into Quadrant 
I Low A LowB 
Insufficient resources and, 
therefore, no conflict. None 
Policy Shift Claims 
Separatist Demands 
Power Shift Claims 
Tula Region, Jewish 
Autonomous Region, 
Omsk Region 
II High A LowB 
Conflict based upon purely 
contemporary principals. 
Moscow Region, 
Sverdlovsk Region, 
City of St. Petersburg 
III Low A HighB 
Conflict based upon purely 
ethnic principals. 
Republics of 
Daghestan, Ingushetia, 
& Chechnya 
IV High A High B 
Conflict based upon the 
ethnicization of economic 
arguments. 
Republics of Sahka-
Yakutia, Bashkortostan, 
& Tatarstan 
'" 
- .- .. ~ - ~. -~ 
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Distribution of the Regions 
in the Diagram 
Quadrant I- 55 Regions
 
Quadrant II- J0 Regions
 
Quadrant Ill- 11 Regions
 
Quadrant IV- 4 Regions
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• The Critical Case ofTatarstan •
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"Even ifyour mouth isfull ofblood, do not spit in public" 
-Tatar proverb 
Tatar History. The narrative of the Tatar people is one of the most compelling and, at times, 
surprising that history offers. The Tatars, as an ethnic group, have existed as an active component of the 
Russian state for over a millennium. Scholars believe that a specifically "Tatar" ethnic group had 
emerged among the Muslim inhabitants of the Volga region by the beginning of the second millennium. 22 
However, this ethnicity was essentially ransacked by the Golden Horde as the invading Mongols overran 
the Volga region and adopted the Tatar name. Russian anger towards their Oriental invaders morphed into 
a more general resentment of the Tatar name and culture. Consequently, when Ivan the Terrible officially 
conquered the Tatar capital in 1552, the effect of this resentment began to be felt. Walker sums up the 
immediate and long-term results of the Russian's misplaced racism in writing that as 
Russia's imperial reach extended across Siberia... Moscow's colonial policies alternated 
between harsh campaigns of religious conversion and cultural assimilation on the one hand, and 
relative tolerance toward non-Russian, non-Orthodox peoples on the other. The Muslim peoples 
of the Volga-Urals region (the ethonym "Tatar" was used equivocally by Russians prior to the 
twentieth century, sometimes designating Muslims, sometimes Turkic-speaking peoples, and 
sometimes all "Orientals," and it was not accepted by the Volga Muslims themselves until late in 
the nineteenth century) reacted with episodic rebellions. (5) 
The sometimes counterintuitive effects of this imperial history are that 1) the ethnic Tatar people inherited 
a name that conferred an undeserved negative reputation, 2) Tatars remained outsiders to most Russians 
even as they continued to exist as a natively Russian ethnic group, and 3) as the Russian empire collapsed, 
the Tatar people saw an opportunity for independence from Russia rather than as a part of it. This on­
going struggle for independence would dominate the next 100 years of Tatar history. 
Throughout the entire 20th century, the Tatar people struggled for the autonomy that they believed 
they had earned. The Russian Revolution and the subsequent years of upheaval provided the opportunity 
for a resurgence in ethnic assertiveness among all Russian minorities. Tatars, sensing that the time had 
finally come for them to be treated as equal members of the Russian state, therefore began a campaign for 
independence. In May 1920, Tatar concerns were addressed but not satisfied when Tatarstan was named 
an Autonomous Republic of the Russian Socialist Federal Republic 23- a status with which they were not 
satisfied. Ravil has recognized three subsequent stages of Tatar history and behavior24 that occurred from 
the beginning of Soviet rule through the collapse of the USSR: 
I. The first stage lasted for over half a century, as Tatars pursued a higher status as a 
22 Walker.
 
23 Maps of Tatarstan are presented in Appendix G. They Republic can also be found on the map provided in Appendix A.
 
24 These stages were not "officially" defined programs; rather, they are the author's method of clarifying recent Tatar history.
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Union Republic of the Russian Federation. 
2.	 The second stage occurred during perestroika (1985 through late 1990). It was in 
this period that Tatarstan, along with all members of the former Soviet Union, 
was required to make countless official (and unofficial) decisions regarding its 
future identity. During this time, Tatarstan established its identity as a 
"multiethnic, multicultural society based on territorial rather than ethnic 
sovereignty". 
3.	 The third stage began in early 1991 and is currently on-going. This post-Soviet, 
"modern" era of Tatar history is the focus of much of the rest of this case study. 
Tatarstan in Post-Soviet Russia. The remarkable facts of recent Tatarstanj25 history have inspired 
a great many investigations and studies. The way in which the republic has developed its economy and 
rebuilt its government in the wake of the USSR has led many to suggest that the "model of Tatarstan" 
begs documentation (Walker 1996; Graney 2001; Teague 1994; McAuley 1997; Dowley 1998). Others 
have gone a step further in asserting that the model's success warrants imitation by other federal regions, 
namely Chechnya (McCann 2004; Robertson, 2001; Lieven 1998; Sharafutdinova 2000); several have 
even erroneously cited Tatar behavior as an indicator of Russia's imminent demise (McAuley 1997; Hale 
1998). This large body of scholarship speaks to the "specialness" of Tatarstan in the post-Soviet. By 
systematically analyzing the region's political standing and leadership, identifying its cultural equipment, 
and recognizing its resource endowments, this research intends to show the compelling way in which 
recent Tatarstani history adheres to the suggested model. 
Tatarstani Politics Since 1990. What is true of most Russian regions is true of Tatarstan as well­
any discussion of politics is dominated (and often overshadowed) by leadership figures. Unfortunately, 
Russian leaders' notoriety is most often due to corruption and incompetence. This, however, is where 
Tatarstan differs from most Russian cases - its president has grown famous for his stable, effective, and 
progressive leadership. Mintimer Shaimiev, who has served as leader and President of the Republic of 
Tatarstan without break since the perestroika period, has been the impetus for the region's development 
and the symbol of its success. 26 
In the past two decades, the government of Tatarstan, under the guidance of Shaimiev, has 
established a high level of legitimacy among its citizens and its political contemporaries. This trust has 
been nurtured through a clever and calculated strategy in which leaders continually positioned themselves 
25 In order to maintain a distinction between the Tatar ethnic group and the Republic of Tatarstan, the term "Tatarstani" will be
 
used to refer to regional matters and "Tatar" will continue to be used when referring to the ethnic group.
 
26 Shaimiev is often presented in contrast to the far less successful President of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudaev. See Teague, 1994.
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in such a way as to negate the arguments of their more radical (or conservative) counterparts. 27 More 
specifically, by promoting a sense of nationalism based upon borders rather than identities, leaders have 
united the hopes and desires of all ethnicities for which Tatarstan is home. The president himself 
crystallized Tatarstan's multinational character in saying: 
By virtue of its geopolitical location, Tatarstan and its capital, Kazan, have played the role of 
a connecting link between East and West. They have been a meeting place of different 
civilizations, cultures, and confessions. Having lived together for many centuries, people 
have worked out their own form of multinational intercourse that has facilitated, and still 
facilitates, the mutual enrichment of languages and cultures and deep traditions of 
understanding and cooperation. (Walker 19) 
Inspiring statements such as this have resulted in a high level of domestic support for the government of 
Tatarstan. This broad and deep legitimacy has translated into political capital for Tatarstani leaders, 
which they have used to establish a highly autonomous relationship with Moscow. 
Tatarstan today enjoys a uniquely powerful status among Russian regions. The Republic's 
"considerable leverage in its relations with Moscow" 28 was first evidenced during the Federation's 
formative period, as the republic was able to 1) establish a regional constitution over a year before the 
larger Federation was able to ratify its own, 2) negotiate a number of topical agreements that solidified 
Tatarstani control over Tatar affairs, and 3) negotiate the first bilateral, power-sharing treaty between the 
Russian Federation and one of its units. 29 In this way, the region has "gained control over much of the 
power and authority generally attributed to sovereign states, including legislative and judicial authority, 
budget and tax authority, defense and foreign policy-making authority, and the capacity for nation­
building" (Graney 33). Tatarstan's autonomy is demonstrated by its many agreements with the larger 
Federation, which are catalogued in Table I.IO. Through the actions of its leadership, Tatarstan has bucked 
the trend of Russian regional ineptitude and has thus established itself as a leader (and a rogue) among the 
units of the Russian Federation. 
27 Radical groups such as the Iffitak Party have been present in Tatarstan for over 20 years. For a more in-depth review of their
 
identity and actions, see Ravil. Chapter 5 (1997).
 
28 Sharafutdinova 16.
 
29 The texts of several of the most important legal documents regarding Tatarstani politics are included in Appendix H.
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Aereements Inyolyinl: the Russian Federation & the Republic of Tatarstan 
Nameffopic of Agreement Date of Signing 
Declaration of Sovereignty by the Republic of Tatarstan 30 August 1990 
Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan 6 November 1992 
Constitution of the Russian Federation 23 December 1993 
Bilateral Treaty between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation 15 February 1994 
Topical Agreements 
22 January 1992 On Economic Cooperation 
5 June 1993 On the Production and Transportation ofOil and Petrochemicals 
On Property 22 June 1993 
On Customs 22 June 1993 
On Environmental Cooperation Unknown 
On Higher Education Unknown 
On Banking, Credit, and Foreign Exchange February 1994 
On Foreign Trade February 1994 
On the Budget February 1994 
On the Defense Industries February 1994 
On Law Enforcement February 1994 
On Military Organizations February 1994 
--~ 
- ~. ~ ~-- ~~-
-
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Tatarstan's Cultural EQuipment. Tatarstan's placement in the lower portion of the model reflects 
the substantial level of cultural equipment that it has at its disposal. In truth, the 4-cell model reflects only 
the low number of Russian citizens that live in Tatarstan--however, an analysis of Tatarstan's cultural 
equipment should demonstrate the accuracy of this measurement: 
I. A history ofethnic independence. 
As was previously stated, the Tatars have existed as an ethnic group for more than a millennium. 
Over the course of its existence, the level of autonomy granted to the Tatar nation has been in constant 
flux. They first experienced independence before the Mongol invasion, and again briefly in the early 16th 
century. Even when the opportunity for modern autonomy presented itself during the Soviet era, Tatars 
were frustrated in their bid for independence. Ravil captures the the cruel irony of the Soviet situation in 
sarcastically writing that that the Tatar nation was 
officially degraded to a so-called feudal nation, making, with the beneficent help of the Big 
Brother, a giant leap from the abyss of its medieval darkness and ignorance to the shining heights 
of Socialism. (Ravil92-93) 
Thanks to this storied history, Tatarstan possesses a sense of autonomy that is so ancient and vivid that 
modern leaders cannot help but reference it. In sum, the Shaimiev government has been able to cite the 
past as both a source of ethnic unity and a precedent for future independence. 
2. An ethnic majority in the region. 
In the modern era, the Tatar's have always constituted a pluralit~lbeit a small one--in the 
regional population of Tatarstan (this dynamic is clearly shown in Figure 1.10). Equally important is that 
the demographics have "remained surprisingly stable throughout the whole period" and have therefore 
solidified the Tatar nation's dominance of its own region. Also, there exist a large number of Tatars in 
diaspora, as the borders of the 1918 Soviet Tatar Republic "were drawn arbitrarily, and 75% of the 
Tatarstani population were left outside their nominal republic" (Teague 21). Therefore, not only do Tatars 
possess the necessary plurality within their own region, but they also enjoy substantial support in the 
Federation as a whole. 
3. The support offoreign nations or organizations. 
Tatarstan enjoys the support of numerous foreign entities, thanks to both historical ties and 
cultural connections. The Muslim identity of the Tatar nation links it with many political units, both 
inside and outside of the Russian Federation. In addition, the sheer length of its history suggests that it 
would find commonality with a great many foreign entities; this pattern is demonstrated in a September 
1992 newspaper article, titled "Tatar Delegation in Vilnius Proposes Treaty with Lithuania Involving Tatar 
Oil", and which reads, 
Brett A. Strand + OfMinorities, Markets, and Mongols + 
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When the problem of Tatar diaspora in Lithuania arose, [Lithuanian leaders] immediately recalled 
the Battle of Gruenfelde [or Tannenberg], in which Tatars and Lithuanians fought together [in 
141O-a victory of Poles and Lithuanians over the Teutonic Knights], after which [they] expressed 
understanding for. .. the Republic of Tatarstan. ('Tatarstan Flexes' 4) 
The region has nurtured its foreign relations by taking 16 missions abroad, signing more than 50 
international agreements, and participating in several international forums and conferences. 30 Tatarstan 
has utilized its connections to such a large extent that "it has become possible to discern the outlines of a 
distinct Tatarstani foreign policy, or what might better be termed 'external relations'" and has therefore 
earned substantial support from its foreign partners (Slocum 58). 
4. Regional control over a "myth ojpeoplehood". 
Tatar history has been analyzed in previous sections, and its impressive scope has thus been 
demonstrated. However, even beyond the pure facts of the Tatar narrative, there exists a palpable sense of 
unity and momentum among the people of Tatarstan. President Shaimiev captures this feeling in writing 
that "It is probably difficult to find another nation, whose history would be so entangled as that of the 
Tatars. Even in Russia itself, where the Tatars constitute the second largest nation, little is known about 
their rich 1000-year old history" (Shaimiev 1997). Indeed, there is a vaguely mythic quality to Tatar 
history, which includes the infamous Genghis Khan and the grandeur of the Russian empire, and which 
still remains an enigma to many observers. The power of the past is not lost on Tatarstani leaders, 
however-Ravil states that "'ancient and splendid Islamic civilization' of this country plays an 
immensely important role" in the political behavior of its leadership (45). 
5. Ethnic figureheads through which regional leaders can motivate the electorate. 
Cultural symbols representing the Tatar nation exist in abundance. Of the possible ethnic 
figureheads suggested by this study (language, heraldry, geography, and popular culture), Tatar culture 
encompasses them all. In recent regional leaders have been able to resurrect and utilize these symbols as, 
The Tatar alphabet has been modernized (i.e., latinized), all children in Tatarstan now study the 
Tatar language ... government functionaries are encouraged to know both Tatar and Russian ... 
the republic has revised the school curriculum to include a great focus on Tatarstani history and 
culture... the new state flag and symbols reflect an identification wit the Tatar people, [and] the 
government has spent a large sum to rebuild Tatarstan's mosques. (Graney 35-36) 
So potent was the desire for Tatar culture that scholars have argued that some of the "burning issues 
underlying [Tatarstan 's] dreams [were] the sad state of national education and the plight of the Tatar 
language" (Ravil 91). What is critical to understanding this dynamic is the way in which the suppression 
of Tatar language and symbols during the Soviet period has had the reverse effect of strengthening the 
uniting power of these ideals. 
30 Sharafutidinova 618. 
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Tatarstan's Resource Endowment. As with cultural equipment, Tatarstan's placement on the 
model suggests a high level of resource endowment (so high, in fact, that the scale of the model does not 
allow for the placement of Tatarstan's true location), Keeping this measurement in mind, the following 
review of Tatarstan's concrete resources reflects three key characteristics of the relevant information: 1) 
that economic data is very flexible in the short term and must therefore be viewed over time, 2) that 
unlike cultural equipment, the components of resource endowment are best illustrated through figures and 
quantities, and 3) that no real list of the definite components of resource endowments can be identified, as 
each region's economic position is infmitely unique and idiosyncratic. 
Therefore, to begin with, some key aspects of Tatarstan's formidable resources (at two points in 
time) are outlined in Figure I.Il and Table I.I2. First, Figure 1.11 presents a few of the many pieces of 
information that led Kondrashov to state that "the republic [was] not just an important pillar of the 
Russian and Soviet economy, but also its net donor"(94). In Table 1.12, the present strength (and diversity) 
of the Tatarstani economy is demonstrated, validating the Republic's own claim that "Tatarstan is one of 
the most economically developed republics of the Russian Federation ... [boasting] wealthy natural 
resources, powerful and diversified industry, high intellectual potential and qualified labor". 31 When 
viewed in tandem, what these two diagrams make clear is that Tatarstan did not just begin the post-Soviet 
period in a strong position--indeed, in years since, it has used its resources as a tool for improving its 
economy even further. This process of steadily increasing economic power shows that "Tatarstan's 
strategic location and economic strength [rendered] it virtually indispensable to Moscow" (Teague 21) 
and that, furthermore, Tatarstani leaders view "the attainment of economic autonomy, and a degree of 
self-sufficiency, as the ultimate goal of sovereignty" (Slocum 59). 
Realizing the futility of gathering data on all aspects of a region's economy, the investigation 
already identified three quantifiable regional characteristics that play a critical role in resource 
endowment, and for which indicators were readily available. In order to analyze Tatarstan's economy, 
this research simply will duplicate its earlier methods-therefore, Tatarstan's status with regards to each 
are listed below: 
1.	 Urban/Capital City Population: The overall population of Tatarstan is higWy urbanized, with some 
70% residing in urban environments by 1989 (see Figure 1.12). There is also an ethnic component to 
this measurement, however, as it is shown that ethnic Russians have been consistently more urbanized 
over time. This is a logical observation, in that most Russians entered Tatarstan as immigrants and 
would have been more likely to settle in its major cities. 
31	 Economy: The Republic of Tatarstan 
(http://www.tatar.ru/index.php?DNSID=e3c3f09f902783d686fDcbb3cd1f41 c1&node id-792) 
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Economic Profile of Tatarstan -1991
 
Among the Largest Regions of the Russian Federation*
 
Industrial OutputPopulation 
% or thePopulation, Output,% or theRegion Region Rb Billions Total'ooos Total 
1. City of Moscow 77.0 6.141. City of Moscow 9003 6.06 
61.0 4.862. Moscow Oblast 6718 4.52 2. Moscow Oblast 
4.113. Sverdlovsk Oblast 51.53. City of SI. Petersburg 5035 3.39 
4. Sverdlovsk Oblast 4785 4. Tumen Oblast 42.7 3.413.22 
41.3 3.295. Krasnador Krai 4738 3.19 5. City of SI. Petersburg 
2.826. Rostov Oblast 4348 6. Chelyabinsk Oblast 35.42.93 
34.7 2.777. Republic of Bashkortostan 3984 2.68 7. Nizhni Novgorod Oblast 
8. Nizhni Novgorod Oblast 3775 31.7 2.532.54 8. Republic 0/ Talarslan 
9. Chelyabinsk Oblast 9. Republic of Bashkortostan 31.0 2.473715 2.50 
2.45 
Russian Federation 
10. Republic o/Talanlan 2.48 10. Samara Oblast 30.73679 
Russian Federation 1254.0 100.00 
-
148543 100.00 
Annual Investment in Fixed Assets Aa:ricultural OUtput 
Output, Investments, % or the% ortheRegion Region Rb Billions TotalRb Billions Total 
10.601. Krasnador Krai 12.8 4.92 1. Tumen Oblast 22.2 
2. Rostov Oblast 8.6 4.089.0 3.46 2. City of Moscow 
3. Moscow Oblast 6.6 3.128.6 3.31 3. Moscow oblast 
4. Republic of Bashkortostan 7.9 3.04 5.9 2.794. Republic o/Talanlan 
5. Stavropol Krai 5. Sverdlovsk Oblast 5.7 2.737.7 2.96 
5.6 2.696. Altai Krai 7.2 2.77 6. Krasnoyarsk 
5.4 2.567. Republic 0/ TaJarrlan 7.0 2.69 7. Republic of Bashkortostan 
8. Saratov Oblast 5.0 2.366.3 2.42 8. Krasnador Krai 
2.349. Volgograd Oblast 6.2 9. Kemerovo Oblast 5.02.38 
10. Orenburg Oblast 4.7 2.22 
Russian Federation 
2.31 10. Chelyabinsk Oblast 6.0 
148543 100.00260.0 100.00 Russian Federation 
I 
* Each list presents the 10 largest regions 
in the stated category. 
Source: Kondrashov. Nalionalist & Sovereignly in Tatarslal1 
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Economic Profile of Tatarstan- 2005 
Component of Resource 
Endowment 
Key Figures 
· 
Defense Industries 
· 
Oil and Gas Pipelines 
·
Plane and Helicopter Production 
·
Crude Oil Reserves--30 million tons per year (6.7% of Russian total) 
• Brown and Black Coal 
Carbonate Rocks, Gypsum, and Other Minerals 
· 
• Numerous Lakes and Rivers, and Underground Mineralized Water 
Resources of Strategic 
Importance 
Natural Resources 
Major Sectors of the Economy 
· 
Gross Regional Produa--S I 0 million rubles (7% over 2004) 
• Aggregate Agriculture Output--68.1 billion rubles (one of three leading regions of the 
Russian Federation) 
·
Per Capita Investment in Fixed Capitaf-36 000 rubles 
• Real Cash Income--18.4% over 2004 
• Index of Industrial Productio~4.6% over 2004 
Domestic Economic Activity 
· 
Major Imports: Non-ferrous Metals, Gasoline, Chemicals, Coal, Textile, Timber, 
Transportation Needs, Consumer Goods 
• Major Exports: Crude Oil, Diesel Fuel, Products of Organic Synthesis, 
• Domestic Sales Volume--$1,414 million, USD 
· 
Domestic Purchase Amount--$793.4 million, USD 
· 
Volume ofServices in Foreign Economic Activity--$122.4 million, USD 
· 
Foreign Investments in Tatarsta~$683,829.4 thousand, USD 
• Largest Foreign Trade Partners: Germany, Poland, Finland, and Lithuania 
Foreign Economic Activity 
Geographic Location 
• Lies at the confluence ofthe Volga and Kama Rivers 
• Land is mainly forest and forest-plain 
·
Climate is moderate-continental. with 170 days ofvegetation growth per year 
• Substantial amounts ofblack-earth soil 
Sources: Official Website o/the Republic ofratars/all; Sharafutdillova, 2000 
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federal "leaders had a significant interest in controlling petroleum exports ... since Tatarstan had been 
a major oil producer since the 1940s" (Sharafutdinova 17). Table [.[[ confirms Tatarstan's large role in 
the production of Russian oil--even more critical to the oil regime, however, is the contribution that 
the Republic makes through pipelines and other forms of oil transport. It is for this reason that 
Walker suggests that one way for Tatarstani leaders to gain leverage over the center is "by cutting off 
the flow of oil and gas through the republic's vital pipeline system" (Walker 35). In sum, Tatarstan's 
dynamic participation in the production of Russia's critical oil regime makes it an indispensable ally 
for Moscow. 
2.	 Foreign Economic Activity: Tatarstan's extensive foreign interaction has been discussed in previous 
sections as a political phenomenon; that Tatarstani international activity is mainly economic in nature 
is equally important. Indeed, Slocum states that 
Tatarstan's external economic relations have been facilitated by a number of bilateral agreements 
on trade and economic cooperation that... normally would be viewed simply as trade agreements 
rather than diplomatic accords. However, in the context of the former Soviet Union, these 
agreements serve crucial political functions [and] ... can be viewed as attempts to renew and 
reinforce Soviet-era economic arrangements. (64-65) 
Clearly, Tatarstan has established and nurtured its foreign economic ties. Moreover, it has often done 
so with the explicit goal of political and international support 
Thus, the three components of resource endowment that were previously measured on the macro-scale 
(urbanization, oil production, and foreign economy) appear to exist in abundance in the region of 
Tatarstan. 
A final note must be made regarding the residual effect of Soviet-style business on the modern 
Tatarstani government. In his well-researched article, Globalization and Post-socialist Development: The 
Tatarstan Variety of Capitalism, McCann (2004) explains that "the [Tatarstani] system is capitalist, but not 
as we know it" and that, in many ways, Tatarstani capitalism remains innately beholden to its Soviet-era 
mechanisms (359). It is commonly acknowledged that socialism continues to retard Russian business and 
Tatarstan is no exception to this rule; what the article compellingly portrays, however, is the way in which 
Soviet business practices also serve as a resource for Tatarstan. In the many qualitative interviews that 
the study conducted, it is obvious that the socialist mindset continues to exist and, crucially, that it 
remains the most effective way of conducting Russian business. This mindset is evident in the following 
direct quotes, taken from McCann's interviews with assorted Tatarstani businessmen: 
The government has a stake in retaining its interests in the strategic branches of the economy... It 
is a fact a fact of life here that if you have family relations in the government your business is 
more likely to be successful. (354) 
Political interference is still a major problem... The state is used to getting its own way [and] ... it 
is basically a process of state fostering of individual companies. (356) 
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[Tatarstanij businessmen don't want to work in Western ways. The laws are not international ... the 
mentality is totally different. It's a different system, totally. Capitalism doesn't do the same thing 
in Russia. (358) 
The system of bribes is working in a stable fashion. (357) 
Taken on their own, this series of opinions would certainly suggest problems for Tatarstan's economy. 
These description, however, predict a completely different effect when considered in light of the 
following quote, from a prominent analyst of the Russian Presidency: 
If anyone says that Russia's establishment is corrupt, I can say yes, yes, for sure. It is possible to 
consider the system corrupt. However, the question is, does it have a bearing on my business? If 
you know what to pay, to whom, it is not a risk, simply another form of expenditure. (358) 
According to McCann, Tatarstani businessmen do know who to pay and how much they ask, and it is for 
this reasons that the economy of Tatarstan remains so successful. In other words, one of the largest 
components of Tatarstan 's resource endowment may very well be the region s continuing endorsement of 
"Soviet-style capitalism". 
The preceding analysis shows the accuracy with which the model captures Tatarstan's storied 
history and its modern identity. This, however, is only half of the suggested theory-indeed, it must be 
remembered that this study has made arguments regarding both regional identities and regional behaviors. 
Therefore, having established that the Republic of Tatarstan possesses the "certain variables" that ought to 
lower the risks of center/periphery conflict, this investigation will assess if Tatar leaders have truly taken 
advantage of their lowered risk and pursued their preference for autonomy. 
Tatarstan's Broad Strategy of Ethnic Mobilization. In the years directly following the collapse of 
the USSR, Tatarstani leaders seized a unique opportunity and gained control over their future. By 
combining the leverage provided by their resource endowments with the passion aroused by their cultural 
equipment, Tatarstani leaders successfully linked their arguments for economic, political, and ethnic 
independence. Two broad processes can be recognized in their pursuit of autonomy: 1) an internal 
process, characterized by political outmaneuvering of nationalist critics and the establishment of a special 
"Tatarstani" brand of nationalism and 2) an external process, in which the republic entered into conflict 
with the center over political autonomy and economic control. These two phases of Tatarstan's post­
Soviet bid for autonomy are linked by the strategy adopted by Mintimer Shaimiev and his 
govemment-understanding the situation presented to them, leaders have continually formed their 
arguments in order to elicit cooperation (and concession) from their opponents. Indeed, Ravil sums up 
the president's legacy by stating that 
One can easily distinguish the cornerstone of his state philosophy: the basis of statehood is the 
people, not just the industrial infrastructure or natural resources. All along the long and difficult 
path of Tatarstan's revival as a state, Mintimer Shaimiev is presenting an example of how state 
objectives can be achieved not through sacrificing the people, but, quite the opposite, through deep 
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compassion for the multiethnic people of his country ... the president [has] managed to tum his 
country's national patriotism from a potentially lethal weapon into a mighty creative tool for 
shaping the future. (1lD-ll1) 
The following discussion will validate these arguments first by defining the two broad phases of 
Tatarstan's post-Soviet political actions using the words of its leaders, which are presented in Table 1.12. It 
will then support its theories more acutely by showing the way in which the Tatarstani strategy strongly 
informed the Republic's actions during the "sovereignty" referendum of 1992. 
Redefining Tatarstani Nationalism. On the domestic level, the words of Tatarstani leaders reveal a 
strategy that combines the force of nationalist rhetoric with the inclusiveness of more contemporary 
definitions of "nation". A few key observations can be made: 
1.	 Tatarstan's leaders introduced a new definition of nationalism, which included all 
citizens of Tatarstan without sacrificing the ideals of the ancient Tatar ethnicity. By 
siting Tatarstan's long-term narrative (which leads straight to autonomy, they argued) 
while emphasizing the need for inclusion in the nation's modem form, Tatarstani 
leaders successfully united their people. 
2.	 At first, radical nationalist forces flourished in Tatarstan, as "nationalism... seemed to 
be able not only to explain the roots of the people's troubles, but also promise a better 
ethnic future for them" (Ravil 88). It was the government's sheer silence in the face of 
these critics, however, that allowed them to dominate their xenophobic arguments. 
Rather than cooperating and compromising with their radical contemporaries (which 
would have jeopardized their objectives by allowing Moscow to accuse Tatarstan of 
harboring ill-will), Tatarsani leaders simply positioned their arguments in such a way as 
to steal nationalism's supporters while betraying its more radical demands. Presidential 
advisor R. Khakimov crystallizes this strategy by stating that 
[The government] immediately formulated the concept of balancing ethnic and 
religious interests, saying that, in fact, we were building a polyethnic and 
polycultural society. Such a structure of the inner relations in the republic allowed 
us to feel confident in our negotiations with the federal center... Internal stability 
helped us to conduct negotiations with the center much more successfully. 
3.	 Leader's comments regarding their economy make one thing abundantly clear: that 
economic development was of the utmost importance to them and that they believed 
that Tatarstan required economic independence in order to grow. Furthermore, their 
words suggest that economic growth was critical not only to Tatarstan as a republic, but 
to the Tatars as a people as well. 
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The Political Philosophy of the Leadership of Tatarstan 
A Collection of Quotes from 1991 to 2007 
On Tatarstan's 
Pursuit of 
Autonomy 
• "There is no donbt that Tatarstan's policy is aimed at changing the republic's status with respect to the 
Russian Federation. But those who say that Tatarstan wants to secede from Russia and, moreover, is 
wrecking the federation are wrong." -VL 
• "Why was Tatarstan more vocal than the other autonomous republics during this process? Because the 
problem of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan as huge republics was always there."-MS 
• "We followed a civilized democratic path and did not seek armed confrontation. We sought only to meet 
the demands of the people."-MS 
• "We immediately formulated the concept of balancing ethnic and religious interests, saying that, in fact, 
we were building a polyethnic and polycultural society. Such a structure of the inner relations in the 
republic allowed us to feel confident in our negotiations with the federal center. .. Internal stability helped 
us to conduct negotiations with the center much more successfully."-RK 
On the Nature 
of Tatarstani 
Nationalism 
• "The Tatar people have always lived with the dream of restoring their statehood."-RK 
• "When the Tatar Republic was formed by decree in 1920, it possessed many rights that were later taken 
away, unfortunately. That is why the question of guaranteeing our rights is coming up today."-RK 
• "The international community had always spoken of human rights and of the rights of peoples to self­
determination. These ideas fell on ripe soil ... This process was waiting for its historical moment."-MS 
• "The Tatar declaration of sovereignty was written in the name of the people of Tatarstan, and we do not 
divide this people into ethnic groups."-MS 
• "On the first day that we proclaimed statehood, we declared that our sovereignty was not ethnic in 
nature... The Republic's multiethnic population has always looked forward to the future with optimism, 
because it appraises friendship and likes to work."-MS 
On Center! 
Periphery 
Conflict 
• "We will not allow an even tougher center than before to form. Russia must not talk to the peoples in the 
language of a state of emergency or in the language of a court." -MS 
• "I consider the primary cause of conflicts in the USSR to be neither ethnic nor national problems, but the 
lack of rights of Union and autonomous republics when they were subsumed under a tightly centralized 
system."-MS 
• "The confrontation with Russian state authorities after the collapse of the USSR was based on a total 
misunderstanding. We never asserted in any official decision that Tatarstan wanted full independence ... 
But at the time, it came off like a bomb." -MS 
• "No matter how difficult, all conflicts should be addressed thmugh negotiations. The main thing, in my 
view, for regulating and preventing conflicts in such a complex country as Russia in the long term is not to 
allow tension to accumulate."-MS 
- - -
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The Political Philosophy of the Leadership of Tatarstan
 
A Collection of Quotes from 1991 to 2007
 
·
"If we do not understand in our heart that Russia is no chance accumulation of territories and tribes but a 
living, historical, organism not subject to arbitrary dismemberment, then we are not worthy of our great 
common past... Shortsighted politicians who satisfy their ambitions by courting cheap popularity and play 
the "nationalities question" card will inevitably become the victims of their bloody game." -AROn the 
·
"If we are going to create a federation under conditions of a civilized society, we have to do it from the 
Russian bottom up."--MS
Federation 
·
"Like it or not, we need a new nationalities policy for Russia. A conception of a nationalities policy has 
been by the President but it is mostly to quiet the society and the republics ... we have to do what is best for 
all nations. We have to help when Russia is having a difficult time. We must peacefully resolve these 
problems with respect for each nation."--MS 
·
"r agree ... that we must not lose the leadership of the economic system. But the question is: how should we 
manage it? Why is the economy of Tatarstan in better shape than that of other regions? ... It is because we 
retained control over the economy. We are moving towards the market, but not in a hurry, carefully 
analyzing each each. We don't command the enterprises but we control them through economic levers."­
RSOn the 
·
"Tatarstan, because of its specific features, is integrated into not only the Russia but also into that of the
Economy 
whole former Union. Therefore, it is natural for the republic to seek to be a full-fledged player in the 
market and to have ties with its partners without intermediaries."--MG 
·
"We have realized that attracting foreign investment without first setting up appropriate market institutions, 
without acquiring the necessary skills for working with securities and without changing our attitude to 
export of oil, we will be an impossible task."--MS 
Ouoted Authorities 
·
Marat Galeyev, Vice-Chairman of the State Committee on Economics (MG)
 
·
Rafail Khakimov, Adviser to the President (RK)
 
·
Vasily Likhachov, Vice-President (VL)
 
·
AJeksandr Rutskoi, Vice-Presidenl (AR)
 
·
Sabirov, Prime Minister (RS)
 
·
Mintimer Shaimiev, President (MS)
 
Sources: Ravil, 1998; Shaimiev, 1998; "Tatarstan Flexes", 1992; ''ratarstan Referendum", 1992; Walker, 1996; McAuley, 1997. 
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Thus, Tatarstan's leadership took the first step in pursuing their autonomy by ensuring the utility of their 
cultural equipment and promoting the importance of resource endowments to their future. 
Political Gamesmanship with the Center. In their early relations with Moscow, Tatarstan's leaders 
pursued a strategy of constant give-and-take. The comments contained in Table LI2 reveal a virtual 
labyrinth of opinions and arguments. For each instance of somewhat aggressive rhetoric ("We will not 
allow an even tougher center than before to form ..."), there exists an equally benevolent statement of 
Tatarstan's good intentions (" If we do not understand in our heart that Russia is no chance accumulation 
of territories and tribes but a living, historical, organism not subject to arbitrary dismemberment, then we 
are not worthy of our great common past. .. "). Moreover, it is possible to recognize several instances in 
which regional leaders (Shaimiev, in particular) made inflammatory statements and, at a later date, 
explained how those statements were simply misunderstood. 
The end effect of this process of political jousting was that Tatarstani leaders were able to 
progressively erode the center's control as their ethnically-tinged arguments for independence, coupled 
with their ever-growing economic prominence, wore away at Moscow's resolve. In this process, one can 
certainly recognize the presence of Markusen's strategy of policy-shifts. Indeed, Tatarstani leaders were 
constantly mindful to pursue their autonomy by way of formal and legitimate avenues. Ravil takes 
analysis a step further by defining the four principles of Tatarstani political strategy: 
I.	 Stability ("The federalization process should not impair the already existing political 
stability".) 
2.	 Voluntary Association ("The abstention from force as an instrument of federalization 
and the reliance on the ... voluntary redistribution of powers in upgrading the status of 
subjects [is] fundamentally important".) 
3.	 Graduality ("New federative formations must be created not by destroying but by 
upgrading the old ones".) 
4.	 Resilience ("Historical, ethnic, religious, and cultural aspects of certain subjects ... 
beget specific federal territories ... it is important to reckon with specific features of 
these subjects and deliver to them more rights and powers than to others".)32 
These principles capture the Tatarstani method of forceful yet non-inflammatory action. By accepting the 
established system and merely insisting upon new power-structures within that system, Tatarstan was able 
to bypass the more damaging consequences of other regional strategies (i.e., power-shift claims and 
separatist demands). 
Perhaps the most ingenious and effective instance of a policy-shift claim by Tatarstani leaders 
32 RavjI 133. 
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resulted from the referendum on sovereignty that the republic chose to hold in early 1992. Shaimiev 
recalls that he chose to hold the referendum "in accord with the declaration of Tatarstan's sovereignty 
which had been announced earlier... Only a referendum-- the most democratic form of public 
expression--could communicate the wishes of the people ... and only a referendum could create peace in 
the republic" (Ravil 124). Realizing the critical importance of remaining legitimate in the eyes of 
Moscow, the President demonstrated cleverness and foresight in managing the potentially disastrous 
situation. 
Political Strategy in the Referendum of 1992. Tatarstani leaders confronted the domestic 
situation by wording the referendum in a highly-specific way, recognizing that they had to unite the 
desires of the Tatarstan's many ethnic groups (such a strategy would, it was thought, appease Moscow as 
well). The text of the referendum read: "Do you agree that Tatarstan is a sovereign state and a subject of 
international law that is building relations with Russia and other republics and states on the basis of 
equal treaties?" (Walker 16). By writing the question in this way, Tatarstani leaders distanced itself from 
Tatarstan's radical nationalist opposition. Shaimiev made clear that he was not seeking independence in 
the name of the Tatar people and "the nationalist opposition perceived this as a betrayal of their ideals... 
This was the crossroads, where the paths of the Tatarstan elected leadership [sic] and of nationalist 
opposition parted company" (Ravil 95-96). Though the final goal remained Tatarstani autonomy, the way 
in which Shaimiev's government framed its statement of sovereignty effectively removed any sort of 
ethnic threat that it might have posed. 
However, in spite of this gentile approach, Tatarstan's leadership was forced to confront its 
consequences on the federal level as well. Yeltsin took issue with the statement, reneging on his 
invitation for Tatarstan to "take all the sovereignty you can swallow" and the assurance that "if you 
[Tatars] want to govern yourselves completely, go ahead" (Walker 12). Consequently, the federal leader 
reminded Tatarstan of the potential repercussions and he "bluntly asserted that he would 'not allow 
Tatarstan to leave the Russian Federation' ... [making] clear his belief that, despite Shaimiev's assurances, 
the main goal of Tatarstan's leadership was full independence" (Walker 18). Therefore, when it was 
revealed that a majority of the region's population (Tatar and ethnic Russian alike) had defied Yeltsin and 
supported state sovereignty, crisis seemed imminent. The leader of Tatarstan's main nationalist 
movement "hastened to announce that the results of the referendum indicate a desire on the part of the 
majority of Tatarstan's population for the republic's full independence from Russia" ("Tatarstan 
Referendum" 7). However, taking the lead for his nation, Shaimiev quickly announced that "the 
republic's goal was not secession---rather, it was a bilateral treaty with Moscow"; by making such a 
statement publicly, Shaimiev prevented the federal center from taking any sort of recursive action against 
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Tatarstan. Yeltsin, forced to make a volte-face and back down from his threats by Shaimiev's disarming 
rhetoric, "made clear that he too preferred compromise" (Walker 19). That compromise, and the bilateral 
treaty to which it eventually lead, would not have been possible had Tatarstan's leadership not acted in 
such a politically intelligent way. The tack taken by leaders in this case clearly demonstrates Tatarstan's 
innovative and well-managed strategy of federal relations, in which political arguments are constantly 
adjusted so as to remain effective and non-inflammatory. 
In the end, Tatarstan's actions regarding its 1992 referendum provide real anecdotal support for 
the conclusions of this research by showing that it was Tatarstan's resources (its economic and political 
importance in the shadow of the Soviet Empire) and its ethnicity (the mobilization of its re-imagined 
concept of nationalism) that allowed it to pursue autonomy through center/periphery conflict. As a critical 
case, Tatarstan therefore aligns with each of the major tenets of this study's theories: possessing 
substantial amounts of resource endowment and cultural equipment, the region faces smaller risks and 
greater rewards from center/periphery conflict than most other regions in the post-Soviet era. Therefore, 
it's leaders have opted for an intelligent and calculated strategy of political conflict with the center that 
has allowed them to successfully pursue their preference for autonomy. 
-56 ­
• OfMinorities. Markets, ana Mongols. Brett A. Strand 
Conclusions: A Rational Means, but to What End? 
This study argues that each Russian region should primarily be viewed as a rational actor with a 
set preference for autonomy; it also outlines two categories of variables that define how each region will 
manage this preference. By suggesting that primordial variables inform a strategy based upon rational 
choice, the study explains center/periphery relations in a way that will satisfy proponents of each of the 
rival theories of ethno-federal relations. In short, it has demonstrated a way to tie ethnic variables to a 
rational theory of ethnic conflict in an empirically viable way. 
What, then, can be said of the future of the Russian Federation? Based upon the arguments made 
by this investigation, one could expect that the pursuit of regional autonomy, and the subsequent center/ 
periphery conflict, are unavoidable dynamics of federal behavior. Therefore, the pertinent question for 
Russian scholars and politician may not be how to prevent conflict, but rather how to manage the conflict 
that will inevitably occur. Perhaps by applying this study's framework, future scholars will be able to 
suggest new strategies for Moscow, strategies that would seem to point to socio-economic development of 
the regions, so ethnic mobilization will not lead to separatism. In remarks made before the Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in 1998, President Mintimer Shaimiev outlined his beliefs 
regarding the future of center/periphery relations in the Russian Federation: 
What worries me? This is a transitional period, and the center can live with asymmetrical 
federalism and treaty-based relations. I do not consider myself a naive person, and I think that 
when the political and economic situation stabilizes, this question will arise in full force and we 
will move toward a symmetrical federalism. Voices will arise calling for democratic but uniform 
federalism. We have to be ready for this; it is a reality of life. Only politics that takes reality into 
consideration is real politics .... 
We all now understand that building a democratic society is extremely difficult. It is easy to call 
for it, but building and leading is a lot harder. But the choice has been made, and it is a historic 
one. This choice draws us toward civilization. We politicians have to be responsible, and 
understand from history what Russia consists of, and with this sense of reality peacefully strive to 
defend the rights of each nation. Only in this way can we build a democratic Russian 
Federation ... ('Conflict Prevention' 73-74) 
Shaimiev's comments reflect the immense challenge that Russia must confront in coming years and the 
mature understanding ofethno-federalism that must define its strategy. 
It is critical that the suggested theory appears to accurately predict not only when conflict will 
occur, but also how that conflict will be conducted. With this in mind, the most valuable inquiry for 
future researchers may be an investigation of those cases that fall into Quadrant III of this study's model 
(i.e., those regions for whom cultural capital is very high and resource endowments are very low). These 
regions are the sort of extreme cases in which cultural extinction is a definite possibility and for whom 
violent conflict would appear to be a rational option. Future research should assess how these regions 
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mobilize their cultural capital in order to pursue their autonomy. Remembering that their behavior will 
always occur in a system which is based upon rational choice, what can we expect that these regions will 
engage in the type of separatist behaviors that this model suggests? Violent conflict grounded in external 
and international support, perhaps? Inter-regional movements, in which ethnic leaders unite their nations 
and defy Moscow while ignoring the system of modem governments and borders? While such an 
investigation is beyond the scope of the current project, it would certainly be a fruitful next step for 
scholars interested in Russia's system of federal relations. 
Another possibility for future research is the possible application of this study's model (Figure 1.7 
on page 29) to other federal structures. The model appears to accurately capture the dynamics of the 
Russian Federation and, perhaps, its system of categorization and regional placement could be 
extrapolated to other states, or even the international political system. Such an investigation would 
certainly test the generalizability of this research's arguments and could provide for a more thorough 
understanding of political behavior on many levels. 
What is clear is that ethnicity in modem Russia cannot be ignored or dismissed. This fact does 
not predict doom for Russia, nor does it suggest that the Russian Federation is an inherently flawed 
political body. As this study has demonstrated, the vast majority of Russian regions simply do not have 
the means to pursue autonomy through center/periphery conflict. Indeed, there is a system of rational 
behavior at work in Russia and, therefore, the modem Russian state does not face the same centripetal 
forces as the Soviet Union. Rationality surely dictates the system of Russian federal behavior, and yet the 
survival of ethnicity has become a rational concern. Thus, separatism remains a possibility in those 
regions where a strong cultural identity exists alongside the type of economic and social crises that might 
threaten ethnic survival. 
Inarguably, in a system in which cultural boundaries are often reinforced by regional borders, 
ethnic issues will always maUer. The future of the Russian state will likely be determined by how well its 
leaders are able to balance the dual demands of ethnicity and governance. Indeed, Russia's greatest hope 
may very well lie in the echoes of her past, as ethnic bonds provide the meaning for a rational, effective, 
and truly fair form of federal government. 
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AppendixA- Administrative Divisions of the Russian Federation 
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Appendix B- Full List ofCases 
r. Repuhlic ofAdygea 12. Mari El 
2. Altai Republic 13. Mordovia 
3. Bashkortostan 14. Sakha (Yakutia) 
4. Buryatia 15. North Ossetia-Alania 
5. Daghestan 16. Tatarstan 
6. Ingushetia 17. Tuva 
7. Kabardino-Balkaria 18. Udmurtia 
8. Kalmykia 19. Khakassia 
9. Karachay-Cherkessia 20. Chechnya 
10. Karelia 21. Chuvashia 
II. Komi 
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Appendix C- Explanation oflndicator Manipulations 
Index ofConstitutional Aggression 
The index was created by assigning 1 point for a region having demanded inclusion in the first 
round of treaty negotiations and 1 additional point for each instance of discrepancy between 
federal and regional law enshrined in the constitution. 
Instances of Protest, War and Rebellion 
This project assigned each region a score between 0 and 3. A score of 0 signified no instances of 
protest, war, or rebellion; a score of 1 signified at least one instance of protest/rebellion; a score 
of 2 signified at least one instance of war; and a score of 3 signified instances of both protest/ 
rebellion and war. 
Timing ofRegion's Declaration ofSovereignty 
Treisman's rankings assign each region a number based upon the quickness with which they 
declared their sovereignty. The rankings, which are on a scale of 0-11, were recoded into a 0-5 
scale by dividing each score by 2, and rounding up when necessary. 
Economic Interaction 
In order to accurately gauge the trend of these figures, this study averaged the figures for January 
2000 and December 2005 in each category. After transferring each of the four figures onto a 5­
point scale, this research chose to combine all resulting scores in order to construct a 
comprehensive index of economic activity. The resulting scores were again used to construct a 5­
point scale, with higher values denoting a higher volume of economic interaction. 
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Appendix' D- Bon'owed Data Sources 
Regional Elite Behavior- Dowley, 1998. 
Region Score N Region Score N 
Adygea 3.62 8 Karelia 3.56 25 
Altai 3.33 6 Khakassia 3.64 II 
Bashkortostan 4.00 46 Komi 3.44 16 
Buryatia 3.50 15 Mari EI 3.86 7 
Chechnya 4.62 62 Mordovia 3.20 15 
Chuvashia 3.62 13 North Ossetia-Alania 3.12 34 
Daghestan 2.84 19 Sakha-Yakutia 3.68 41 
Ingushetia 3.50 30 Tatarstan 4.33 43 
Kabardino-Balkaria 3.05 21 Tuva 3.80 15 
Kalmykia 3.29 17 Udmurtia 3.43 14 
Karachay-Cherkessia 3.00 11 
-~. 
-
.- - -~ 
-
~ 
Timing ofRegional Sovereignty- Ttiesman. 1997. 
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AppendixE- Results of the Eta Test 
Eta Values 
Primordial Indicators Eta Significance 
0.522* .016 
Titular Nationality's Sharing of the Russian Orthodox Faith 
Titular Nationality Status as Ethnic Minority or Majority 
.102 
Historical Autonomous Status 
.323 
..288 .069 
Rational Choice Indicators 
.016 
Presence of Oil or Oil Pipeline 
Population of Capital City, 2002 .548 
AOO .080 
Combined Monthly Economic Interaction .019.641 
*- Significance at the .05 level. 
-- ~ : "..:~ -~ 
-
-~ ~ -~ 
-
Appendix F - Interaction among Bargaining Variables 
The study perfonned a brief, cursory analysis of the interaction between the three bargaining 
indicators. Three models were created, with each model including one of three possible pairings of 
bargaining indicators. The study then tested each two-indicator combination for correlation with the 
dependent variable (R2) through the OLS method. In this way, the research was able to assess which 
indicator pairings, if any, exert an exceedingly large influence on regional aggression. The results were: 
Indicator Pairing RZ Significance 
Oil & Economic Interaction .275 .024 
Oil & Capital Population .264 .055 
Economic Interaction & Capital Population .250 .075 
Clearly, none of the indicator pairings exerted a substantially greater influence on regional aggression 
than any other. Therefore, a region that possesses oil and a high-level of economic interaction was found 
to be no more likely to engage in conflict than will a region that possesses oil and a large capital-city 
population. The basic investigation did not suggest that there is no particular combination of "bargaining 
chips" that exert an exceedingly large influence on regional aggression; it merely demonstrated that, 
among these three variables, there was no substantially influential combination. In order to investigate 
the issue further, researchers should perform similar analyses using larger pools of variables and more 
theoretically coherent models. 
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Appendix G-Political & Geographic Maps of the Republic ofTatarstan. 33
 
06u.t.!rl!!Orp".K~l!elu.. KAPTA 
PECnV&nMKM UU,PCTAH 
.,~ 
33 Official Website of the Republic of Tatarstan; National Museum of the Republic of Tatarstan. 
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Appendix H - Selected Legal Documents of the Republic ofTatarstan 34 
Declaration of State Sovereignty, 30 August 1991. 
DECLARATION
 
on the state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan
 
The Supreme Soviet of Tatar Autonomous Soviet Social Republic,
 
-realizing the historical responsibility for the fortunes of multinational peoples;
 
-expressing respect to sovereign rights of all peoples, inhabiting the Russian Federation and the USSR;
 
-realizing the incapability of the status of Autonomous Republic, and the interests of future political, economic, social and
 
spiritual development of the multinational peoples;
 
-ensuring the inherent rights of Tatars, of the whole population of the Republic to self-determination;
 
-aiming at the creation of legal democratic state,
 
1. PROCLAIMS Tatar state sovereignty and reforms the Autonomous Republic into the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic (Tatar
 
SSR) - The Republic of Tatarstan.
 
2. The land, its natural resources and other resources on the territory of the Tatar SSR shall be the exclusive property of Tatar
 
people.
 
3. Irrespective of nationality, social origin, belief, political convictions and other differences, Tatar SSR shall guarantee all
 
citizens of the Republic equal rights and freedoms. Russian and Tatar shall be state languages and shall be equal in Tatar SSR, the
 
maintenance and development of languages of other nationalities shall be ensured.
 
4. The official state name in the Constitution, in other legal acts and in state activity shall be "Tatar Soviet Social
 
Republic" ("Tatar SSR" or "The Republic of Tatarstan"). Republic's Supreme body of power shall be named "The Supreme Soviet
 
of the Tatar SSR" and its enacting acts shall be named: acts of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR.
 
5. The present declaration shall be the basis for Tatar Constitution, for Tatar legislation, for participation of Tatar SSR in drafting
 
and signing the Union Treaty, for agreements with the Russian Federation and other republics. It also shall be the basis for the
 
presentation of the most important questions of state formation of Tatar SSR, its relations with the USSR, with the Russian
 
Federation and other republics for the consideration of its people. The Constitution and the acts of Tatar SSR shall be supreme on
 
the territory of Tatar SSR.
 
6. Before the adoption of new Constitution of Tatar SSR, other laws and regulations of Tatar SSR, acting laws of Tatar SSR, of
 
the Russian Federation and the USSR remain valid on the territory of Tatar SSR, unless they contradict the Declaration on the
 
state sovereignty of the Tatar SSR.
 
The present Declaration shall come into force from the date of its adoption.
 
M. Shaimiev,
 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tatar Soviet Social Republic
 
Kazan, August 30,1990 
Resolution Regarding the Referendum on State Sovereignty, 21 February 1992. 
Taking into account the fact that the determination of state status of the Republic of Tatarstan is the most important question of 
state activity, concerning the interest of each citizen, and ensuring the constitutional principle of the execution of state power by 
people directly by means of referendum, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatarstan Republic RESOLVES: 
1. To submit the question on state status of the Republic of Tatarstan at a referendum. 
2. To conduct the referendum on March 21, 1992. 
3. To include in the ballot paper the following formulation of the question submitted at the referendum and the variants of voters' 
answers: "Do You agree, that the Republic of Tatarstan is the sovereign state, the subject of international law, forming its relations 
with the Russian Federation, other republics and states on the basis of equal agreements? " "Yes" or "No". 
4. To establish an order according to which during the referendum, which shall be conducted on March 21. Central election 
Committee on the Deputy elections shall fulfill duties of Central referendum's Committee on the basis of article 19 of the 
Tatarstan's Law "On the referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan"; in the regions - the corresponding regional and urban election 
Committees on the Deputies' elections shall fulfill duties of the regions' and urban referendum's Committee. 
5. To establish an order according to which those who have no permanent place of residence on the territory of the Republic of 
Tatarstan shall not take part in the referendum. 
34 All texts published by Kazan State University. 
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6. To oblige the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, local Soviets of People's Deputies to ensure the 
guarantees of citizens' free will on the referendum's question in strict accordance with the Law "On the referendum in the 
Republic of Tatarstan". To exclude the possibility of any pressure on citizens, preventing them from realization of their right to 
take part at the referendum. 
7. To invite representatives from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), representatives from Russia's Republics and 
international organizations who wish to take part in the control process as observants. 
8. To oblige Regional and urban Soviets of People's Deputies to ensure the organization of polling places and the referendum's 
Committees not later than on February 25. 
9. To oblige the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic ofTatarstan to settle the questions, concerning the material and financial 
maintenance on conducting referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan, the questions of transport and communication service 
according to needs of Central election Committee of the Republic of Tatarstan by the time before March 1. 
10. To recommend social amalgamations, mass media, their editorial boards to ensure a comprehensive and objective 
interpretation of the essence of referendum's question, the method of voting in easily understood form for wide sections of 
population. 
11. Voting results shall be determined all over the Republic of Tatarstan in general. 
12. According to article 1 of Republic's Law "On the referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan" , the answer at the referendum in 
the Republic of Tatarstan shall be final, shall be valid on the whole territory of the Tatarstan Republic and shall be revoked or 
changed only by means of a new referendum in the Republic of Tatarstan. 
F. Mukhametshin, 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan 
Kazan, February 21, 1992 
Constimtion of the Republic ofTatarstan (extract), 6 November 1992. 
Article I. The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a sovereign democratic state, expressing the will and interests of the whole
 
multinational people of the republic.
 
The sovereignty and powers of the state shall come out from the people.
 
The state sovereignty shall be an inalienable qualitative status of the Republic ofTatarstan.
 
Article 4. Tatar and Russian shall be equally official languages in the Republic of Tatarstan.
 
Article 5. The state bodies in the Republic of Tatarstan shall take guidance from the principles of legal state, i.e. from the
 
supremacy and strict observation of laws, division of legislative, executive and judicial powers.
 
Article 8. The Republic of Tatarstan shall reject violence and war as the means of setting disputes among the states and nations.
 
The territory of The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a zone, free of mass destination weapons.
 
The propaganda of war shall be prohibited in The Republic of Tatarstan.
 
Article 9. The earth, mineral wealth, water, forest and other natural resources, the animal and vegetable kingdom, means of state
 
budget, assets of national banks, cultural and historical values of the peoples of Tatarstan and other estate ensuring the economic
 
independence of the republic, the preservation of material and spiritual culture, shall be the property of the whole people.
 
Article 11. The economic activities in The Republic of Tatarstan shall be based on private, state-owned, municipal (communal)
 
and public property.
 
Land plots and other subjects, objects and projects. used in any sphere of activities not prohibited by the law, may be the private
 
property.
 
The property of other states, international organizations, foreign juridical persons and aliens, stateless persons as well as the joint
 
property of private citizens, juridical persons and the state shall be allowed in The Republic of Tatarstan.
 
Article 19. The Republic of Tatarstan shall have its own citizenship. Reasons. procedures of acquiring and renouncing the
 
citizenship of The Republic of Tatarstan shall be established by the Law on the Citizenship of The Republic of Tatarstan.
 
Citizens of The Republic of Tatarstan shall be admitted to the citizenship of the Russian Federation - Russia.
 
Citizens of The Republic of Tatarstan may acquire the citizenship of other states under conditions determined by treaties and
 
agreements between The Republic of Tatarstan and other states. Citizens of The Republic of Tatarstan may keep dual citizenship
 
or renounce it.
 
Each person shall have the right to choose the citizenship and the right to change it. Deprivation of citizenship or of the right to
 
change the citizenship shall be prohibited.
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Article 59. The Republic of Tatarstan shall independently determine its state and legal status, making decisions concerning
 
political, economic, socio-cultural development. The laws of The Republic of Tatarstan shall enjoy supremacy all over its
 
territory, unless they contradict international obligations of The Republic of Tatarstan.
 
Article 61. The Republic of Tatarstan shall be a sovereign state, a subject of international law, associated to the Russian
 
Federation - Russia - on the base of the Treaty on Mutual Delegation of Powers and Subjects under Jurisdiction.
 
Article 62. The Republic of Tatarstan shall establish relations with other countries, adhere international treaties, exchange
 
diplomatic, consular, commercial and other missions, participate in international organizations, taking guidance from the
 
principles of international law.
 
Generally recognized principles and norms of the international law shall priorto the laws of The Republic of Tatarstan.
 
Adopted on November 6, 1992 
Bilateral Treaty between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, 15 February 1994. 
TREATY
 
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan
 
"On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian
 
Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan"
 
The plenipotentiaries of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan:
 
empowered by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan;
 
based on the universally recognized right of all nationalities to self-determination and the principals of equality, voluntariness and
 
free will;
 
having the aim to guarantee the preservation of territorial integrity and the common economic interest;
 
wishing to promote the preservation and development of historical and national customs, cultures, languages;
 
being concerned about ensuring civil peace, international accord and national security;
 
acknowledging the priority of basic human rights and freedoms regardless of nationality, religion, location of habitation and other
 
differences;
 
taking into account that the Republic of Tatarstan, as a State, is united with the Russian Federation according to the Constitution
 
of the Russian Federation, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Treaty "On Delimitation of Jurisdictional
 
Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the
 
Republic of Tatarstan", and participates in international and foreign economic relations,
 
have agreed to the following:
 
Article I 
Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Authority between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation 
and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be governed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the 
Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the present Treaty. 
Article II 
The Republic of Tatarstan has its own Constitution and Legislation. 
The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall execute the authority of state power and shall: 
1) guarantee the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; 
2) form the republic budget, define and impose the republic taxes; 
3) decide issues concerning jurisprudence and notary public; 
4) implement the legal regulation of administrative, family and housing relationships, as well as relations in the area of 
en vironmental protection and use of nature; 
5) grant amnesty to individuals, convicted by the courts of the Republic of Tatarstan; 
6) decide issues of possession, use and disposal of land, mineral wealth, water, timber and other resources, as well as state 
enterprises, organizations, other movable and immovable state property, located on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan, 
which is the exclusive property of Tatarstan's people except for units of federal property. Delimitation of the state property shall 
be governed by a separate Agreement; 
7) establish the system of state governmental bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan, their organizational structure and activity; 
8) decide issues of the republic citizenship; 
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9) establish the order for alternative civil service on the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan for citizens who have the right to 
substitute their service in the anned forces according to federal law; 
10) establish and maintain relations, conclude treaties and agreements with the republics. territories, regions, autonomous 
districts and regions, with the cities of Moscow and St.-Petersburg of the Russian Federation. which shall not contradict the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. the present Treaty and other agreements 
between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan; 
11) participate in international affairs. shall establish relations with foreign states and conclude treaties, which shall not contradict 
the Constitution and international obligations of the Russian Federation. the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan and the 
present Treaty, shall participate in the activity of corresponding international organizations; 
12) create a National Bank pursuant to a separate Agreement; 
13) independently conduct foreign economic activity. The delimitation of authorities in the field of foreign economic activity 
shall be settled by a special Agreement; 
14) decide on the order established by a separate Agreement, questions of conversion for enterprises. which are in the possession 
of the Republic of Tatarstan; 
15) establish state awards and honorary titles of the Republic of Tatarstan. 
Article III 
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan jointly are authorized to: 
I) guarantee the civil rights and freedoms of persons and citizens. the rights of national minorities; 
2) protect sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
3) organize mobilization of the national economy. direction of the design and production of armament and military equipment on 
the territory of the Republic of Tatarstan; questions concerning the sale of annament, ammunition. military equipment and other 
military property. as well as conversion of the defense industry. The form and share of the Parties' participation shall be governed 
by a separate Agreement; 
4) settle the common and contradictory questions of citizenship; 
5) coordinate the international and foreign economic relationship; 
6) coordinate pricing policy; 
7) create funds for regional development; 
8) pursue monetary policy; 
9) manage the items of property of the Russian Federation or the Republic of Tatarstan. which may be transferred to common 
management according to interest based on voluntary and mutual consent. The forms and the order for common management of 
specific items shall be governed by a separate Agreement; 
10) coordinate activity on questions of geodesy. meteorology and calendar system; 
11) create joint funds for the purpose of financing common programs, elimination of the consequences of disasters and 
catastrophes on the basis of mutual agreements; 
12) coordinate the management of common power system as well as highway, railway, pipe, air and tubing. water transport. 
communications and information systems; 
13) ensure an unobstructed and duty-free regime for movement of transportation of vehicles. cargoes and production by air, sea. 
river, railway. motor road and also through pipe transport; 
14) estimate the quality of environment conditions according to international standards and promote the measures for its 
stabilization and restoration; secure the ecology. coordinate the action concerning use of land, water and other natural resources; 
prevent ecological disasters and settle questions on specially protected natural territories; 
15) implement common policy in the social sphere: population employment patterns. migration processes. social protection. 
including social welfare; 
16) coordinate activity on issues of health. family protection. maternity. paternity. childhood, education, science, culture. physical 
culture and sport; preparation of national specialists for schools. educational institutions, establishments of culture, mass media 
and other institutions and organizations; shall provide pre-school organizations and educational institutions with native language 
literature; shall coordinate scientific research in the field of history, national cultures and their languages; 
17) deal with problems of personnel for justice and police enforcement; 
18) settle litigation. arbitration and notary public question; 
19) coordinate the activity of police enforcement agencies, the cooperation of security services. creation and use of programs to 
combat crime; 
20) establish common principals for organization of state bodies and local self-government; 
21) establish administrative. administrative-legal. labor. family. housing. land. water, timber legislation. legislation on mineral 
wealth. on protection of the surrounding environment; 
22) address the questions of common use of land, mineral wealth, water and other natural resources; 
23) execute other authority established by mutual agreement. 
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Article IV 
Within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its State Bodies are found: 
I) the adoption and alteration of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, as well as control of their 
observance; the implementation of the federal system and the territory of the Russian Federation; 
2) regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; questions of citizenship in the Russian Federation; 
regulation and protection of rights of national minorities; 
3) establishment of a system of federal legislative, executive and judicial power and the order of their organization and activity; 
formation of federal bodies of state authority; 
4) the federal state property and its management; 
5) establishment of the basis of federal policy and federal programs in the fields of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural 
and national development of the Russian Federation; 
6) establishment of the legal basis for a common market; finance, currency, credit, customs regulation, money supply, principals 
of general price policy; federal economic agencies, including federal banks; 
7) the federal budget, federal taxes and duties, federal funds for regional development; 
8) the federal power system, nuclear energy, fissionable materials; federal transport, communication pathways, information and 
communication systems, space activity; 
9) foreign policy and international relations of the Russian Federation, international agreements of the Russian Federation; 
questions of war and peace; 
10) foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation; 
II) defense and security; the defense industry; the determination of the order of sale and purchase of armament, ammunition, 
military equipment and other miijtary property; production of poisonous substance, drugs and the order of their use; 
12) the determination of the status and defense of the state frontier, territorial waters, air space, the exclusive economic area and 
continental shelf of the Russian Federation; 
13) the judicial system; the procurator's Office; penal legislation, criminal procedure and penal-executive legislation; amnesty and 
clemency; civil, civiI procedure and arbitration-procedural legislation; 
14) federal conflict law; 
15) the meteorological service, standards, standard metres, metric system of measures, time calculation, geodesy, cartography, 
names of geographical places; formal statistics and book-keeping; 
16) state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation; 
17) federal state service. 
Article V 
Judicial documents, issued by state bodies, institutions and officials of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan 
within the limits of authority of these state bodies, institutions and officials, shall be valid. 
Article VI 
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation as well as the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have no rights to issue 
any legal acts on issues, which do not relate to their area of responsibility. 
The State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan as well as the Federal State Bodies shall have the right to protest against the acts of 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan where they infringe upon the present Treaty. 
Disputes on the execution of authority in the sphere of common competence of the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and 
the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall be settled in accordance with the procedure agreed to between the Parties. 
Article VII 
For the purpose of execution of the present Treaty the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the 
Republic of Tatarstan shall have the right to conclude additional agreements, create joint structures and commissions on an equal 
footing. 
Article VIII 
The State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan shall have plenipotentiary 
representatives in the cities of Moscow and Kazan. 
Article IX 
No unilateral cancellation, alteration or amendment of the present Treaty or its provisions shall become valid. 
The Treaty shall become effective 7 days after its signing and shall be published for public dissemination. 
The present Treaty is concluded on February 15, 1994 in the city of Moscow in two copies, each in Russian and Tatar, both texts 
having equal judicial force. 
-xi­
• OfMinorities. Markets. and Mongols • 
On behalf of the 
Russian Federation: 
President of the 
Russian Federation 
B. Yeltsin 
Prime Minister of the 
Russian Federation 
V. Chemomyrdin 
Brett A. Strand 
On behalf of the 
Republic ofTatarstan: 
President of the 
Republic ofTatarstan 
M. Shairniev 
Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Tatarstan 
M. Sabirov 
Moscow. February 15.1994 
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